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Articles
Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative
Theory to Understand and Overcome
the Plausibility Pleading Standard
Anne E. Ralph*
INTRODUCTION
The Twombly' and Iqbal2 cases drastically changed the pleading
standard for lawsuits governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, requiring a litigant to plead facts demonstrating that her
right to relief goes beyond "sheer possibility" and is, in fact,
"plausible."3 Prior to these cases, litigants and judges alike understood
that Rule 8, which by its terms requires only a "short and plain
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1. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Ashcroftv. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. Id at 678. Although the Court in Twombly and lqbal used various terms to describe what
it was requiring of a complaint, it is the word "plausible" to which those who would characterize
the decisions continually return. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of "Plausible
Pleadings": An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. lqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2
(2010) ("[Tlhe word plausible, as used and perhaps overused in justice Kennedy's Iqbal opinion
twenty-two times, sets forth this new standard.").
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statement of the claim,"4 embodied a liberal notice pleading standard.s
Post-Twombly and Iqbal, a court must carefully weigh the allegations
in a pleading to determine whether the allegations state a legal claim
that is plausible; the plausibility inquiry requires the reviewing court
to consider "obvious alternative explanation[s]" and "to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense."6
The plausibility standard has been widely denounced as a
frustration for plaintiffs, a slippery and idiosyncratic standard, and a
barrier to justice.7 These criticisms have particular import for civil
rights and discrimination plaintiffs, who stand to be affected uniquely
by the plausibility standard.
However, pleading post-Twombly and Iqbal need not be the tale of
woe that so many scholars foresee. In fact, as this Article argues,
greater awareness of narrative theory and greater reliance on
narrative techniques can help litigants and judges understand and
comply with the plausibility standard.
Because the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard requires a
litigant to persuade the court that her claim has facial plausibility-
that is, does the description of the way events occurred "ring true"?8-
the standard is especially appropriate for application of narrative
techniques. This Article argues that the Supreme Court has implicitly
directed lower courts to evaluate pleadings for the strength of the
stories they tell, inviting litigants to use storytelling techniques to
endow pleadings with narrative richness. As a result, the puzzle
created by the plausibility pleading standard can be solved by using
storytelling techniques.
Section I of this Article gives an account of the genesis of the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard, noting how it emerged
and has evolved in the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence. Section
II explores some of the most common criticisms of the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions and the plausibility standard, including criticisms that
the standard requires factual information that is beyond the reach of
many plaintiffs, and that it confers excessive discretion upon trial
court judges. Section III gives an overview of narrative theory and
narrative techniques in light of their usefulness in interpreting the
plausibility standard. Section IV demonstrates how greater reliance
4. FED.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2).
5. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 554 (2002)
[hereinafter Fairman, Heightened Pleading]; Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 431, 434-39 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility Pleading].
6. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 682.
7. See infra notes 82-143 and accompanying text.
B. See infra notes 104 and 190 and accompanying text.
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on narrative helps resolve the plausibility pleading puzzle, because it
provides litigants and judges with a useful guide in giving meaning to
the plausibility standard. Section IV also addresses problems that may
arise from an increased emphasis on narrative. Finally, the Article
offers suggestions for litigants and courts to proceed with greater
emphasis on narrative.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING
A. Pre-Plausibility: The 1938 Rules and Conley's "No Set of Facts"
Formulation
Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the
familiar language of Rule 8, which requires only that a pleading
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,"9 was understood to embody a liberal
notice pleading standard.o
Rule 8, promulgated as part of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was intended to simplify the preexisting pleading
landscape, which largely relied on "fact pleading": the fact-pleading
regime "overemphasized hypertechnical distinctions," "produced
conflicting judicial interpretations," and created a "quagmire of
unresolvable disputes" about whether facts had been properly
pleaded.1 For instance, prior to the 1938 Rules, many states
implemented supposed procedural reforms known as the Field Code;
under the code, pleading rules provoked "unresolvable disputes"
about whether allegations in a pleading should be characterized as
assertions of "ultimate fact," as "mere evidence" or as "conclusions"-
all of which were virtually undistinguishable from one another.12 Such
disputes wasted court and litigant time, and often gave artful pleaders
9. FED.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2).
10. See, e.g., Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 5, at 554 (explaining how Rule 8,
"with its splendid simplicity, stands as the centerpiece of a procedural system designed to rectify
the pleading abuses of the past"); see also, e.g., Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 5, at
434-39 (tracing the history of Rule 8 notice pleading). It must be noted that, despite the familiar
language of Rule 8, there have long been areas of the law that, ostensibly governed by the liberal
language of Rule 8, were in fact "riddled with requirements of particularized fact-based
pleading," as my colleague Christopher M. Fairman has argued and carefully catalogued.
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003)
[hereinafter Fairman, Notice Pleading] (discussing substantive areas of the law in which courts
imposed heightened pleading standards including antitrust, civil rights, RICO, conspiracy, and
defamation claims). Civil rights claims are among those cases in which courts sometimes
imposed a heightened pleading standard, even though Conley directed otherwise. See id at
1027-32.
11. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 5, at 555-56.
12. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
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a tactical advantage, unrelated to the merits of a case, at the expense
of "the unwary or the inexperienced pleader."13 Written to eliminate
such protracted and wasteful disputes, the 1938 Rules, and Rule 8 in
particular, were intended by their drafters to be "simple, uniform, and
transsubstantive."14
Under Rule 8, as instituted in the 1938 Rules, pleadings were
intended only to provide notice-not to state facts, narrow issues for
discovery, or dispose of nonmeritorious claims.15 As a whole, the 1938
Rules were designed to guarantee access to courts, guarantee litigants
their day in court, and enable determinations on the merits.16
This understanding of Rule 8's liberal notice pleading standard was
encouraged by the Supreme Court's own language in Conley v. Gibson.
In Conley, the Court memorably explained that, under Rule 8, "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."17 In Conley, a
group of African-American railway workers alleged that their union
had violated its duty of fair representation.18 The union moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs did not set
forth specific facts in support of their discrimination claim.19
The Supreme Court held that the Conley plaintiffs had stated a claim
under Rule 8, and pronounced that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."20 According to the Court in Conley, the "no
set of facts" formulation was "the accepted rule" for assessing the
sufficiency of a complaint.21 Because the allegations in plaintiffs'
complaint, if proven, would have demonstrated a breach of the
union's duty, the complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.22
In addressing the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs'
complaint "failed to set forth specific facts to support its general
13. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1218 (3d
ed. 2013).
14. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 5, at 556.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 558.
17. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added), abrogated by Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
18. Id.at42.
19. Id. at 43, 47.
20. Id. at 45-46.
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allegations of discrimination," the Conley Court emphasized that "the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."23 Importantly, the
Court described pleading under the Federal Rules as "simplified
'notice pleading."'24
In Conley, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to the liberal
pleading philosophy espoused in the Federal Rules, and effectively
quieted any resistance to the rules25 Following Conley, the generally
accepted view of pleading was that a pleading should survive a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim as long as the allegations in the
complaint demonstrated that plaintiff could possibly prove her
entitlement to relief.26
B. Twombly: The Death Knellfor "No Set of Facts"
Into this world of "no set of facts" notice pleading came Twombly,
which sounded the death knell for notice pleading.27 In Twombly, the
Court considered the proper standard for pleading an antitrust
conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act through allegation of
parallel conduct.28 The plaintiffs, a class of subscribers of local
telephone and high speed internet services, alleged that the
defendants, a group of incumbent local exchange carriers, violated
Section 1.29
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids restraints of
trade that are accomplished through contract, combination, or
conspiracy, a pattern of parallel behavior is circumstantial evidence of
an agreement to restrain trade, and is consistent with allegations of a
conspiracy, but alone is not sufficient to establish a violation of
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id.
25. Marcus, supra note 12, at 433-34.
26. The understanding that Rule 8 embodied the liberal notice pleading standard
highlighted in Conley was further supported by the Court's decisions in Leatherman and
Swierkewicz. In Leatherman, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit could not impose "a
more demanding rule for pleading a complaint under § 1983 than for pleading other kinds of
claims for relief," affirming that it was inconsistent with both Rule 8 and Conley to require
Section 1983 claims to be pleaded with more particularity than other claims governed by Rule 8.
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167
(1993). In Swierkewicz, the Court held that it was error for the Second Circuit to require an
employment discrimination complaint to contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination in order to state a claim. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
See also, e.g., Fairman, Notice Pleading, supra note 10, at 994-97 (tracing Supreme Court's
repeated "embrace" of "simplified notice pleading" in Conley, Leatherman and Swierkewicz).
27. See, e.g., Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 5, at 431 ("Notice pleading is dead. Say
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Section 1.30 As the Court explained, "mere interdependent parallelism
does not establish the contract, combination or conspiracy required
by Sherman Act § 1."31 To establish a Sherman Act offense, a contract,
combination or conspiracy must be demonstrated, in order to rule out
the possibility that the defendants were merely acting
independently.32
The Twombly plaintiffs alleged parallel anticompetitive behavior by
the defendants.33 Thus, they also needed to establish a contract,
combination or conspiracy, and they attempted to include such
allegations in the complaint. The allegation termed the "ultimate"
allegation by the Supreme Court was this: "Plaintiffs allege... that
[the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to
prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or
high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete
with one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to
one another."34
Although plaintiffs had filed a complaint of 96 numbered
paragraphs, spanning 28 pages, the Supreme Court ruled that the
complaint's allegations were insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.35 In so holding, the Court announced a new definition of the
standard a plaintiff must meet to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: "stating
such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken
as true) to suggest that an agreement was made."36 Put another way,
the Court required "plausible grounds to infer an agreement."37
Allegations that "plausibly suggest[]" agreement would be "not merely
consistent with" agreement, but rather would "raise[] a suggestion
of... agreement."38 The Court explained that the need to show
plausible grounds to infer an agreement reflected Rule 8's "threshold
requirement" that even a "'plain statement' possess enough heft to
'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief."'39
As to the plaintiffs' complaint itself, the Court found the allegations
insufficient under Rule 8 to state a claim that was plausible on its
30. Id at 553.
31. Id. at 553-54 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
32. Id. at 554.
33. Id. at 548.
34. Id. at 551 (quoting 51 of plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint).
35. Id. at 554.
36. Id. at 556.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 556-57.
39. Id. at 557.
6 [Vol 26:1
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face.4o Because the claim rested on descriptions of parallel conduct,
the Court looked for any allegations in the complaint that would
invest the ILECs' action "with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy."41
However, the Court found that the ILECs' behavior was "natural" and
"was not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history teaches anything."42
In finding the plaintiffs' allegations of conspiracy implausible, the
Court looked to an "obvious alternative explanation" for the ILECs'
behavior, and found such an explanation in economic literature and
history.43 The Court explicitly relied on "prior rulings and considered
views of leading commentators" as it concluded that another
alternative better explained defendants' conduct, rendering plaintiffs'
claim implausible.44
In announcing the new plausibility standard, the Court emphasized
that it did not require a claim be shown to be probable at the pleading
stage: "Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement."45
The Court also put the Conley "no set of facts" formulation to rest,
explaining that the "no set of facts" language should not be "read in
isolation as saying that any statement revealing the theory of the
claim will suffice unless its factual impossibility can be shown from
the face of the pleadings."46 Noting that the "no set of facts"
formulation from Conley had "been questioned, criticized, and
explained away long enough," the Court concluded it was "best
forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard."47 The Court also explained that its ruling had "practical
40. Id. at 554.
41. Id. at 566.
42, Id. at 566-67.
43. Id. at 567.
44. Id.at556&n.4.
45. Id. at 556. The Court also noted that "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable and that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
46. Id. at 561. According to the Court, reading Conley literally would mean that "a wholly
conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support
recovery." Id. at 561 (internal quotations omitted). The Court also noted that "a good many
judges have balked at... the literal terms of the Conley passage." Id. at 562.
47. Id. at 562-63. As described infra Section II, the Court's rejection of the Conley standard
jeopardizes the clarity and transsubstantivity intended by the drafters of the Federal Rules,
places an unnecessarily heavy burden on plaintiffs, and threatens to reduce access to justice
generally. Contrary to the majority's rejection of Conley's time-honored formulation, Justice
Stevens' dissent provides a stirring defense of the Conley standard, explaining that the pleading
standard in the Federal Rules as interpreted in Conley "does not require, or even invite, the
pleading of facts." Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2014]1 7
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significance," in that it would not allow a plaintiff with a "mere
possibility" of success to go forward with a "largely groundless claim"
and force the expenses of discovery on a defendant faced with a
meritless suit.48
Following the Twombly decision, the contours of the plausibility
pleading standard and the breadth of its applicability remained in
question.49 Would the standard apply only to antitrust cases that
promised expensive discovery? Or was a more comprehensive change
to civil pleading standards taking place? The Iqbal decision answered
those questions.
C. Iqbal: The Other Shoe Drops
The Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal confirmed that the Twombly
plausibility standard was indeed applicable to all cases governed by
Rule 8 and further explicated that standard.so
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Javaid Iqbal, a citizen
of Pakistan and a Muslim, was arrested on criminal charges and
detained by federal officials as a person "of high interest."51 Iqbal filed
a Bivens action against a number of federal officials, including the
petitioners before the Supreme Court: John Ashcroft, former Attorney
General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, who at the time of
the case was the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.52
Iqbal alleged that petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller had adopted an
unconstitutional policy that subjected him to imprisonment on
account of his race, religion or national origin.53
The Court held that Iqbal's pleadings were insufficient to state a
claim, because Iqbal had not pleaded sufficient "factual matter that, if
taken as true, state[d] a claim that petitioners deprived him of his ...
constitutional rights"; in other words, he failed the plausibility
48. Id. at 557-58. The Court specifically mentioned that discovery in antitrust cases "can be
expensive." Id. at 559. The Court described the "potential expense" of discovery in the Twombly
case as "obvious." Id. Noting that lower courts had had only "modest" success in "checking" the
cost of discovery through careful supervision, the Court explained that requiring allegations to
make out a plausible claim was the only hope for avoiding "the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal
relevant evidence." Id. at 559.
49. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf ("What does Bell Atlantic
really mean? ... [T]he Court's opinion presages more expansive application.").










Although lqbal's complaint described in detail the conditions under
which he was held in a maximum security detention center, and
although it detailed some of his claims against other defendants who
were not before the Court,55 the Court confined its review of the
allegations in plaintiffs complaint to those explicitly concerning
Ashcroft and Mueller.56
The Court ruled that Iqbal had failed to state a claim as to Ashcroft
and Mueller, and, in so doing, further explained the plausibility
standard: "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."s7 The Court
explained that the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to go
beyond conclusory, legalistic allegations,58 and also acknowledged
that the standard requires something short of a demonstration that a
claim is likely.59
The Court established a two-step process for lower courts to use in
determining whether the plausibility standard is met: First, the court
should disregard any allegation in a pleading that is no more than a
"legal conclusion" masquerading as a factual statement; "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements" should not be considered under the
plausibility standard.6o The Court clarified that the first step is not the
place for disregarding allegations that are "unrealistic or
nonsensical"-allegations should be disregarded if they are
"conclusory," not because they are "extravagantly fanciful."61
Second, the court should review the "well-pleaded factual
allegations," assuming their truth, and "determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."62 This second step
ensures that "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
54. Id.
55. Those defendants allegedly "kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and
dragged him." Id. at 668 (quoting 1[113 of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint).
56. Id. at 668.
57. Id.at678.
58. Id. (noting that the plausibility standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation").
59. Id. ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.").
60. Id. at 679. The Court explained its departure from the broad language of Conley by
stating that "Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions." Id.
61. Id.at681.
62. Id. at 679.
2014] 9
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survives a motion to dismiss."63 At this second step, the Court directed
that a lower court should "draw on its judicial experience and
common sense" to assess the plausibility of the pleader's claim.64 The
Court termed the application of judicial experience and common
sense "a context-specific task."65
In Iqbal's case, the Court held that the complaint failed to plead
sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful and intentional
discrimination at the hands of Mueller and Ashcroft.66 At the first
plausibility step, the Court ignored, as conclusory "bare assertions,"
the allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" Iqbal to confinement "as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
national origin."67 The Court also disregarded, as conclusory, the
allegations that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the policy
and that Mueller was "instrumental in adopting it."68
At the second step, the Court concluded that the remaining factual
allegations did not give rise to a plausible inference that lqbal's arrest
and detention were the result of intentional discrimination.69
According to the Court, there were "more likely explanations" for
lqbal's arrest and detention, which prevented his allegations from
"plausibly establishing" his claim.70 On the facts that Iqbal alleged, the
Court identified an "obvious alternative explanation": that the policy
was legitimate, that the arrests were lawful and justified by a
nondiscriminatory intent; given that alternative explanation, the
Court found that "discrimination [was] not a plausible conclusion."71
Thus, with the Iqbal decision, the plausibility pleading standard was
extended to all cases governed by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As well, the Court gave lower court judges explicit
permission to apply their "judicial experience and common sense" in
assessing the plausibility of a pleader's entitlement to relief.72
D. Post-Twombly and Iqbal
The Supreme Court has not yet issued another foundational
decision explaining the plausibility standard. Certainly, in the few
63. Id.
64. Id at 679.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 680-84.
67. Id. at 680-81.
68. Id. at 680-81.
69. Id. at 681.
70. Id. at 682.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 679.
10 [Vol 26:1
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss1/1
2014] Ralph 11
years following Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court has not
disavowed the cases; thus, the plausibility pleading standard remains
a puzzle for litigants and lower courts to study and understand.73
Lower courts have admitted the plausibility standard does not come
with much guidance, and have struggled to apply it.74 Perhaps most
significantly for this Article, the Seventh Circuit described the
plausibility standard as a directive from the Supreme Court ruling
"that the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of
the case to present a story that holds together."75 However, many
lower court characterizations of plausibility have been less helpful;
among other things, courts have wrestled with the definition of
"plausibility"76 and with the question of how judicial experience and
common sense should be used in evaluating a complaint.77 Courts
73. Recent decisions from the Supreme Court demonstrate the continued applicability of the
plausibility standard, including Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233
(2011) and Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011).
In Skinner, a state prisoner filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Texas violated his
right to due process by refusing to allow him access to material for DNA testing. Skinner, 131 S.
Ct. at 1295. The Skinner decision was notable because it gave a nod to the plausibility standard,
but in doing so relied on a pre-Twombly and Iqbal formulation of the standard for a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1296. Neither Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion nor
justice Thomas's dissent mentioned Twombly or Iqbal by name. Instead, the majority opinion
relied on Swierkewicz v. Sorema, N.A, id (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514
(2002)), a 2002 case which established that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a
discrimination plaintiff need not plead facts alleging a prima facie case, but rather need only
include 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ...
'giv[ing] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."' Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). To the
extent Swierkewicz embodied the spirit of a "simplified pleading standard" applicable to all civil
actions, id. at 513, the Court's decision to cite that case may signify that simplified notice
pleading retains some viability. See also John M. Barkett, Skinner, Matrixx, Souter, and Posner:
Twombly and lqbal Revisited, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 69, 78 (2011). Cf Joseph A. Seiner, After lqbal,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 179, 193 (2010) [hereinafter Seiner, After lqbal] ("It is worth considering
that there may be serious concern following Iqbal as to the validity of the Swierkiewicz
decision."); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (2010) ("The
continued vitality of... Swierkiewicz is in doubt.").
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011), plaintiffs brought a claim
for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR
§ 240.10b-5 (2010). Citing Twombly and lqbal, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had stated
a claim, because the complaint's allegations of materiality sufficed "to 'raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' satisfying the materiality requirement... and to
'allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."' Id at 1323.
74. See Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2012)
[hereinafter Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing] ("Courts have struggled to comprehend
the outer limits of plausibility and the role of their own experience when adjudicating a motion
that historically has not involved determinations of fact").
75. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).
76. Reinert, Pleading as Information Forcing, supra note 74, at 16 & nn. 100-01 (collecting
cases).
77. Id. at 17 & n. 105-07 (collecting cases).
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have variously described the plausibility standard as "confusing,"78
"opaque,"79 "relative,"8o and "malleable."81 The following section of
this Article will describe in further detail the main criticisms of the
plausibility pleading standard that have emerged since its
announcement.
II. CRITICISMS OF PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING
Academic reactions to the newly minted plausibility standard have
been highly, if not entirely, negative.82 The Twombly and Iqbal
decisions have been called, among other things, "a more demanding
standard that requires a greater factual foundation than previously
was required or originally intended"83; "an embarrassment to the
American Judicial System in which a majority of the Supreme Court
chose to reject the rule of law"84; and "a new and ultimately ill-advised
direction" for pleading in civil suits.85
Commentators ascribe various underlying motivations to these
decisions.86 Some theorize that the Court simply could not accept that
78. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) ("What makes Twombly's
impact on the Rule 12(b)(6) standard initially so confusing is that it introduces a new
'plausibility' paradigm for evaluating the sufficiency of complaints. At the same time, however,
the Supreme Court never said that it intended a drastic change in the law.").
79. Swanson, 614 F.3d at 411 (Posner, I., dissenting) (describing lqbal's general requirement
of "plausibility" as having been established in "opaque language").
80. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) ("In other words, the height of the
pleading requirement is relative to circumstances. We have noted the circumstances (complexity
and immunity) that raised the bar in the two Supreme Court cases.").
81. Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Exactly how
implausible is 'implausible' remains to be seen, as such a malleable standard will have to be
worked out in practice.").
82. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010); David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of lqbal, 99 GEO. L.I. 117, 119 &
n.12 (2010) (noting that "[c]ommentators have been sharply critical" and listing articles).
However, reactions to Twombly and lqbal are not entirely negative. See Dobyns v. United States,
91 Fed. Cl. 412, 428 (2010) ("Twombly and Iqbal probably are best seen merely as restating, in
slightly different terms, propositions long held.... [T]hese cases do not... treat the newly-
minted 'plausibility' paradigm as altering the way in which courts should apply other long-
standing pleading requirements."); see also, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to
lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.I. 1, 16 n.53 (2010)
[hereinafter Miller, Double Play]; Steinman, supra note 73, at 1298 ("challeng[ing] the
conventional wisdom that Iqbal and Twombly run roughshod over a half-century's worth of
accumulated wisdom on pleading standards").
83. Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 19.
84. Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. lqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and
Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571 (2012) (referring to Iqbal) [hereinafter Subrin, Contempt for
Rules].
85. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited].
86. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, lqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 217, 218-19
(2010); Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v.
lqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 964 (2010); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change,
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the defendants acted in the way they were described to have acted,
and therefore "vouched" for the defendants.87 Others have concluded
that the language of Iqbal itself suggests hostility towards Iqbal, and
perhaps towards other discrimination plaintiffs.88 Another scholar
argues that the Court simply accepted a particular narrative about
wrongdoers in government, and disregarded other possible stories.89
Other commentators assert that Twombly and Iqbal embody the
Court's changing opinions about meritorious litigation in general and
civil rights claims in particular.o Finally, at least one scholar has
2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 145, 178 (2011); Tung Yin, "I Do Not Think (Implausible) Means What You
Think it Means". lqbal v. Ashcroft and judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 203, 215 (2010).
87. For instance, Yin reads the decision in lqbal as "as a sort of judicial vouching for the
government official defendants." Yin, supra note 86, at 215. Yin has suggested that it is possible
that what the lqbal majority concluded on the facts was that Ashcroft and Muller would not have
engaged in this conspiracy. See id. at 212 ("[I]t appears that the majority simply could not accept
that Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller would have engaged in a conspiracy to
discriminate against Arabs and Muslims by intentionally subjecting them to harsh treatment...
for no legitimate reason. This is what the Court found implausible about Iqbal's complaint.") The
Court, therefore, was asserting that it was unbelievable that Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI
Director Mueller would have agreed to subject Muslims and others to harsh conditions due
simply to their race, religion, or national origin, and without regard for any legitimate penal
purpose. Id.
88. See Eichhorn, supra note 86, at 964. Eichhorn writes that the lqbal opinion represented a
"shift in frame with respect to older understandings of notice pleading." Id at 964. The Court's
language "phrases its ruling against Iqbal as the denial of an entitlement he has mistakenly
assumed." Id at 963-64. According to Eichhorn, "this new use of the language of entitlement
transforms the plaintiff from someone who was generally presumed to have a right to proceed to
discovery into someone who is being presumptuous and displaying an outsized sense of
entitlement in even requesting to proceed." Id. at 964. See also id at 965 (identifying the "note of
deception" in the phrase "'a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"' and in the
majority's characterization of "Iqbal's argument as seeking 'license' to 'evade' the Rules'
pleading requirements") (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1950, 1954)).
89. Iqbal itself has been portrayed as the triumph of a particular, familiar narrative over
other possible meanings. Dorf argues that, in lqbal, the Supreme Court selected a particular
narrative of the fight against terrorism, which Dorf calls the "few-bad-apples narrative":
According to this narrative, the "harsh treatment of detainees," including in Guantanamo, "was
the work of a relatively small number of relatively low-ranking military and civilian officials who
went beyond the limits of the law. The actions of these few bad apples, the narrative goes, were
regrettable but not the result of official policy." Dorf, supra note 86, at 218-19. The Court
accepted this narrative by concluding "that the inference that Ashcroft and Mueller had relied on
race, national origin, or religion in deciding whom to treat as high-value suspects is not
plausible." Id at 227. In other words, the Court in lqbal was "content to imagine that prisoner
abuses-in this case occurring in a federal maximum security prison in Brooklyn rather than at
Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, or a CIA black site-were the work of low-level rogue actors, not
high-ranking Bush Administration officials." Id at 225. Dorf argues that the Court demonstrated
that "[h]uman beings, including Supreme Court Justices, are prone to view facts as conforming to
pre-existing stock scripts or narratives," and "blinded themselves to the possibility that the
world did not conform to their narrative." Id at 227-28. This reliance on familiar stock stories
might cause "worry that the Court's acceptance of the few-bad-apples narrative normalizes the
underlying abuses." Id. at 228.
90. Sherry argues that the Court in Twombly and Iqbal was updating its "factual
assumptions about the litigation process." Sherry, supra note 86, at 178. She argues that the
Court appeared to be demonstrating skepticism "about the percentage of meritorious cases," in
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argued that, in announcing the plausibility standard, the Court simply
ventured inadvertently into new territory without intending to break
as much new ground as it did.91
Assessing the critical reaction to the decisions, one can identify
several main lines of criticism.92 These critiques apply with special
force to civil rights cases.93 Because each of these grounds of criticism
relates to narrative theory, this Article will examine each in greater
depth.
A. Plausibility Forces Plaintiffs into a Difficult Position
The first criticism of Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility standard
reflects widespread concern over parties' unequal access to the
information necessary to satisfy the plausibility standard, especially
in civil rights cases. The standard is criticized for creating a "Catch-22"
in cases in which the defendant controls the information necessary for
stating a plausible claim; the plaintiffs in such cases cannot state a
claim without access to critical information in the control of
defendants, and they cannot proceed to discovery without stating a
claim.94 Because the standard requires a plaintiff to plead sufficient
facts to render his or her claim plausible, meritorious claims may
never be brought to light, simply because the plaintiff cannot obtain
the necessary facts without access to discovery.95 Critics of the
line with lower court opinions "that meritless cases can impose a significant burden on
defendants well before a motion for summary judgment can be effective, because of the costs of
discovery." Id at 178. Sherry also noted that it was "no coincidence that Iqbal involved a claim of
discrimination," because of the Court's "recent skepticism about discrimination," including
changes in assumptions "about the overall prevalence of racially discriminatory motives among
American employers." Id. at 178, 166 (describing line of cases including McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); and
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
91. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 82, at 850 ("[A]II opinions in the two cases
smack more of confusion than of political motivation.").
92. Noll, supra note 82, at 120-21.
93. Civil rights and discrimination cases present a particular puzzle for applying the
plausibility standard. See Suzette M. Malveaux, The jury (or More Accurately the judge) Is Still
Out for Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-lqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 722 (2013)
(describing effect of Twombly and Iqbal on civil rights and discrimination cases) [hereinafter,
Malveaux, TheJury Is Still Out]; see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in
the QuestforJustice, 37 OHio N.U. L. REV. 621, 622-31 (2011); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading
and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of lqbal on
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 85-102 (2010) [hereinafter Malveaux, Front
Loading].
94. Charles B. Campbell, Elementary Pleading, 73 LA. L. REV. 325, 346 (2013) (describing
"what scholars and some cases refer to as information asymmetry-the situation in which facts
needed to plead adequately remain under a defendant's control and thus inaccessible without
discovery"); Noll, supra note 82, at 120.
95. Steinman, supra note 73, at 1311; see also Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 105
(noting that, because the plausibility standard "require[s] a plaintiff to have greater knowledge
concerning his claim either before instituting an action or immediately thereafter, inequality of
14 [Vol 26:1
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Twombly and Iqbal decisions have argued that the plausibility
standard is so heightened that it requires a plaintiff to marshal the
kind of factual support for his or her claim that previously was only
required on a motion for summary judgment or, indeed, at trial.96
This pleading "Catch-22" is particularly problematic for plaintiffs
alleging they were subject to discrimination or violations of civil
rights, as the information those plaintiffs need to state a plausible
claim may be uniquely within the possession of the defendants.97
information access during those critical time frames poses a significant-if not the most
significant-problem for many people seeking affirmative relief').
96. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under lqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS& CLARK L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) ("The standard for the motion
to dismiss has evolved in such a way as to make the motion to dismiss the new summary
judgment motion."). Cf Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary]udgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 72 (2007) (noting that, even
prior to Twombly, "the formal distinction between summary judgment and motions to dismiss
on the pleadings had been eroded").
Critics of the decisions who recognize a new burden on plaintiffs at the complaint phase also
argue that the extension of the "plausibility" standard from Twombly to all civil cases was an
illegitimate change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, short-cutting the legislative process
by circumventing Rule 8 without undergoing the processes prescribed by the Rules Enabling Act.
Noll, supra note 82, at 120-21; see also Cristina Calvar, "Twiqbal": A Political Tool, 37 J. LEGIS. 200,
222 (2012) ("[T]he court has used the adjudication process to circumvent the amendment
process.").
Critics argue that such a dramatic change to the pleading standards should have been left to
elected representatives. See Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 83-89 (noting criticism that
"with Twombly and lqbal, the Court may have forsaken its long-held commitment to the
rulemaking process by reformulating the Rules' pleading and motion-to-dismiss standards by
judicial flat"). See also Subrin, Contempt for Rules, supra note 84, at 577. In particular, critics
claim the decision embodied in Twombly and Iqbal about the need to reduce the burdens of
discovery on defendants was a political judgment the Court was ill-suited to make; a decision
about whether the burdens of discovery in meritless lawsuits have become too much for
defendants to be required to bear would have been better left to congressional action following
formal hearings and testimony. See Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 85, at 851
(arguing that the decision to screen against weakly pleaded, rather than completely
nonmeritorious suits, involves policy decisions the courts are ill-equipped to handle); Clermont
& Yeazell, supra note 82, at 850 (arguing that "rulemaking bodies should have hosted" a
discussion on whether pleading rules should more vigorously screen for meritorious claims);
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 5, at 454 ("[Tlhe rule amendment process is preferable
[to judicial revision of pleading standards] because it is a much more democratic, transparent,
and accountable method of making changes to the Federal Rules."); see also Subrin, Contemptfor
Rules, supra note 84, at 579 (noting that "[t]here is no evidence that discovery is an
unreasonable burden in the vast majority of cases. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary .
97. See Subrin, Contempt for Rules, supra note 84, at 580 ("Plaintiffs, particularly in ...
discrimination cases where discovery is frequently needed to determine the facts, states of mind
and otherwise, that reside in the defendants' minds and files, and in the minds and files of
defendant-friendly witnesses, will be left out in the cold."); see also Howard M. Wasserman,
lqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 168
(2010) ("The two most notable pieces of information that are beyond plaintiffs reach [in
constitutional and civil rights litigation] at the outset are evidence of defendants' subjective state
of mind and evidence of defendants' private, behind-closed-doors conduct."). Wasserman
highlights what he calls "the paradox" of civil rights pleading: A plaintiff must draft a factually
sufficient complaint before he or she has access to the very discovery that will supply many of
the key facts of his or her claim. Id. at 168. See also Seiner, After lqbal, supra note 73, at 228
(noting the challenges of a "more complex and undefined plausibility test" for employment
15
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Proving intent in an employment discrimination case, for instance, is
difficult.98 Due to unequal access to key information and lack of formal
discovery procedures prior to filing a complaint, plaintiffs in civil
rights cases often tell a story at the complaint phase that includes
facts making legal and illegal behavior equally.plausible.99
In the absence of formal pre-filing discovery available under the
Federal Rules, academics have suggested various mechanisms for
remedying this information imbalance, from the readily-available to
the novel, including use of informal pre-filing discovery and more
reliance on FOIA requests.100 For instance, several commentators have
discrimination plaintiffs, since "Iqbal creates an arduous burden for Title VII plaintiffs by
mandating that allegations of discriminatory intent cannot be general or conclusory and must be
made with the proper factual support").
98, See Seiner, After lqbal, supra note 73, at 195-96 ("Proving intent in an employment-
discrimination case is certainly a tricky endeavor, and pleading intent after Iqbal may be even
trickier. What it means to plausibly plead discriminatory intent under Title VII remains an open
question and will likely be a matter for the courts to resolve."). See also Charles A. Sullivan,
Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1642 (2011).
Describing how the facts in an employment discrimination case are uniquely outside the grasp of
the plaintiff, Sullivan writes: "What the putative plaintiff will rarely 'know' is the employer's
intent in taking the challenged action.... Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes do not
bar particular conduct-such as failure to hire or a decision to discharge. Such actions are
perfectly acceptable unless motivated by discriminatory intent" Id
99. See Malveaux, The Jury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at 725-26 ("[D]iscriminatory intent is
often difficult, if not impossible, to unearth before the parties have had some discovery.
Discrimination has become more subtle and institutional. It can be harder to detect because it is
less overt and transparent; instead it takes the form of stereotypes and unconscious bias.").
100. Wasserman, supra note 97, at 168. Suggestions for reforming discovery processes to
aid plaintiffs in meeting the plausibility standard may strike readers as ironic, especially since
the Court's decision in Twombly indeed appeared motivated in part by a desire to avoid
excessive discovery costs. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (citing Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he costs of modern
federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against
sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can
construct a claim from the events related in the complaint")); see also Miller, Double Play, supra
note 82, at 61-62 ("Twombly justified establishing plausibility pleading on the basis of
assumptions about excessive discovery costs for these organizations and the threat of
extortionate settlements.").
Although the Court's adoption of the plausibility standard has been praised for its potential to
eliminate excessive discovery costs on litigants and burdens on trial courts, see, e.g., In re Text
Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing Twombly, "even more
clearly than its successor" Iqbal, as "designed to spare defendants the expense of responding to
bulky, burdensome discovery unless the complaint provides enough information to enable an
inference that the suit has sufficient merit to warrant putting the defendant to the burden of
responding to at least a limited discovery demand"), that argument supposes that the
plausibility standard actually screens successfully for meritorious versus nonmeritorious claims,
see Steinman, supra note 73, at 1312. In fact, the plausibility standard gives no such guarantees
of its success rate, particularly in light of its subjectivity. Id.; see also Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up
the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us AboutJudicial
Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1233 (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, Doctrinal
Intersections] (noting that, to the extent the decisions were motivated by attention to discovery
abuses, the Court's approach was "one-sided," focusing "only on the problem of discovery abuse
by reference to the incidence of nonmeritorious litigation ('groundless' is the Court's word of
choice) brought by plaintiffs"). Indeed, some research suggests that the standard may not
16
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proposed a system of limited, formal pre-filing discovery.1ol However,
unless and until a solution can be implemented, litigants facing an
information asymmetry still must deal with the plausibility standard,
and a greater reliance on narrative, as discussed below, is a promising
solution.
B. Plausibility is an Idiosyncratic, Amorphous Standard
The second line of criticism of the plausibility standard embodies
the widely-shared impression that directing judges to apply their
"judicial experience and common sense"102 confers "virtually
unbridled discretion"o3 on a district court judge to determine
whether the allegations in a complaint "ring true" to that particular
judge.104 Along these lines, the plausibility standard has been
characterized as impracticably open-ended, conferring broad
alleviate concerns about abusive discovery costs and drawn-out meritless litigation. See, e.g.,
Calvar, supra note 96, at 217 (explaining theories "that the recent standard actually increases
[litigation] costs and prolongs efforts").
101. See Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 105 & n.406 (suggesting some "form of limited
preinstitution discovery to provide access to critical information"). More intensive proposed
changes include permitting targeted or "flashlight" discovery after a motion to dismiss is filed.
See id. at 107 & n.414. Miller views such "early, limited, and carefully sequenced discovery" as a
possible "fruitful middle ground for evaluating challenges to cases that lie between the
traditional Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the complaint's legal or notice-giving insufficiency
and a motion based on the complaint's failure to meet the factual plausibility precepts of
Twombly and lqbal." Id A carefully-constructed procedure could "bring some equilibrium to the
burdens on the parties at the pleading and motion-to-dismiss phases of litigation" but would
also tax judicial resources and require rule amendment See id. at 118-25. Such a course would
require either an amendment of Rule 27 or would force litigants to rely on state pre-suit
discovery provisions of different scope. Id. at 105-06. It would also subject litigants to a new
procedural hurdle (showing the need for discovery) and tax judicial resources. Id at 106. See
also Jonathan D. Frankel, May We Plead the Court? Twombly, lqbal, and the "New" Practice of
Pleading, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2010).
Other proposals for correcting the information asymmetry problem posed by the plausibility
standard have included changes to the federal courts' system of case management Miller, Double
Play, supra note 82, at 114. However, proposals for "tracking" cases based on the substantive
governing law to allow different kinds of discovery would undoubtedly require an abandonment
of the Civil Rules' signature characteristic of transusbstantivity. Id at 118.
Finally, some have suggested abrogating Twombly and Iqbal entirely by rule by adding additional
classes of cases requiring heightened pleading to Rule 9, or amending the Federal Rules and the
Federal Forms to better reflect pleading rules and provide more instructive sample pleadings.
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 82, at 855-57 (Under the Rule 9 approach, which would
implement a familiar "particularity" requirement, "courts can sensibly demand factual detail,
whereas testing for factual convincingness without an evidential basis is inherently
destabilizing.").
102. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
103. Access to justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. lqbal Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on theJudiciary, 111th Cong. 9 (2009)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Prof. Arthur M. Miller),
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller091027.pdf.
104. See Comment, Pleading Standards, 123 HARv. L. REV. 252, 262 (2009) (quoting Adam
Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at
A10); see also Noll, supra note 82, at 120 & n.18.
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discretion on judges to enforce a slippery standard.ios
According to Professor Miller, concepts of common sense and
judicial experience are "highly subjective concepts largely devoid of
accepted-let alone universal-meaning."106 Certainly, judges'
common sense and experience could be considered "extra-pleading ...
factors."107 The Court's apparent attempt to mask this shift to
subjectivity by using language that suggests an objective
measurement compounds, for some, the frustration.108
The direction to apply judicial experience and common sense may
matter most in civil rights cases, which will often require a judge,
assessing whether a pleading will survive a motion to dismiss, to
gauge the plausibility of allegations that a defendant acted with
discriminatory intent.109 Critics of the plausibility standard express
concern that inviting judges to incorporate their own experiences
risks preferencing a dominant, majority perspective over outsider
voices-which threatens the role of the federal judiciary as a
protector of minority rights.11o As this criticism goes, a standard based
105. Noll, supra note 82, at 120. See also Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: lqbal's
Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
1443, 1451 (2010) (calling "plausibility" and "common sense" concepts that are "malleable and
ill-defined"); Malveaux, The jury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at 723-24 (alleging the plausibility
standard "fails to give judges enough guidance on how to determine whether a complaint should
be dismissed," "create[s] unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and confusion," and threatens
"excessive subjectivity ... depending ... on the identity of the judge").
106. Hearing, supra note 103, at 9 (statement of Prof. Arthur M. Miller). See also Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 82, at 840 ("Judges will vary in finding nonconclusory allegations of a
complaint implausible after considering the specific 'context' of the case and applying 'judicial
experience and common sense."); Hillel Y. Levin, lqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex
Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 148 (2010) ("Justice Kennedy's explanation of the role of
the judge in Iqbal is, depending on your view of this sort of thing, refreshingly candid or
stunningly lawless (or perhaps both).").
107. Hearing, supra note 103, at 8 (statement of Prof. Arthur M. Miller).
108. With the talk of sheerness, heft, and thick pleading, lqbal's metaphors of pleading were
ripe for examination in a law review article. See Eichhorn, supra note 86, at 967-69. Eichhorn
argues that the conceptual metaphors the Court created in Iqbal, treating factual allegations as
having physical mass, associated the plausibility inquiry with "notions of consistency and
objectivity," while obscuring the enormous amount of discretion given to judges under the
standard. Id. at 969. Similarly, Eichhorn points out that "both the Twombly and Iqbal opinions
speak in terms of a fixed line separating the merely possible from the plausible." Id at 969. The
"fixed line" metaphor also appears to modulate the discretion given to judges under the
plausibility standard, suggesting "that it is possible to differentiate consistently between the
possible and the plausible; one need only look to see whether the allegations have crossed some
agreed-upon, fixed boundary." Id. at 969. According to Eichhorn, such metaphors "downplay the
substantive shift in the law, reinforcing the notion that the Court's analysis is simply a fair and
consistent application of precedent, rather than a usurpation of the Congressional power to
change the Federal Rules." Id, at 974. See also Kassem, supra note 105, at 1453.
109. See, e.g., Kassem, supra note 105, at 1453.
110. Malveaux notes the evidence of "significant differences in perception among racial
groups over the existence and pervasiveness of race discrimination" and posits that "some
judges, like many Americans, may operate from the presumption that race discrimination is a
thing of the past," leading the judge "to conclude that, based on the facts before him, intentional
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on experience cannot help but incorporate beliefs judges formed as
members of a socially and politically elite group."n Reference to
judges' own sense about the world may be particularly problematic if
judges hold inaccurate beliefs about the frequency or likelihood of
discrimination in society.112
Similarly, the term "plausibility" itself is relatively novel to pleading
and procedure cases,113 and therefore, poorly defined.114 The
indeterminacy of the term invites idiosyncratic and even political
interpretations.115
Without firmer direction from the Supreme Court, it will be up to
judges to assess how to apply their "judicial experience and common
sense" to assess plausibility and gauge the likelihood of other
alternative explanations.116 This ambiguity also creates costs for the
discrimination is implausible, especially in light of alternative explanations available." Malveaux,
TheJury Is Still Out, supro note 93, at 724. See also Kassem, supra note 105, at 1446.
111. A. Benjamin Spencer, lqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 185, 197 (2010) [hereinafter Spencer, Restrictive Procedure] (arguing that the
plausibility standard reveals "the institutional biases of the justices, as elite insiders with various
presumptions about the conduct and motives of other fellow societal elites"). Spencer also
identifies an intransigence, not necessarily born of elitism but that bespeaks an unwillingness to
consider others' stories, which has negative effects on plaintiffs, including those from historically
disadvantaged social groups. Id at 199-201 ("What we see in these opinions is the justices'
willingness to prefer their own interpretation of facts over other interpretations, leaving no
room for the possibility that other understandings may have validity.... Such a perspective
ends up favoring civil defendants, at least when they are arrayed as adversaries against
members of various societal out-groups.").
112. See Spencer, Restrictive Procedure, supra note 111, at 198. Spencer notes that "the
Court's 'experience and common sense'is not universal but rather is shaped by their perspective
and bias as societal elites who suppose that such discrimination is rare." Id. Sherry writes that,
"[t]o the extent that the Court has come to believe both that invidious discrimination is no longer
the most likely explanation for adverse employment actions, and that litigation is too
burdensome to trust the judgment of plaintiffs and their lawyers," anti-discrimination plaintiffs
are at a high risk. Sherry, supra note 86, at 182-83. See also Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond
Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal's Effect On Claims of Race Discrimination, 17
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 (2011). Quintanilla explains that majority group members believe
(wrongfully) that "discrimination is no longer a problem for minority group members in
American society," and "that racism is a psychopathology-that racists act in blatant and overt
ways," rather than encompassing behaviors both overt and subtle. Id. at 55.
113. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 82, at 851-52 ("Not only was [the term
"plausibility"] new to the world of pleading, it was largely new to the world of civil procedure.").
114. See Reinert, Pleading as Information Forcing, supra note 74, at 8 ("Plausibility is
something more than mere possibility or conceivability, the Court has told us, but something less
than a preponderance test"); see also Hoffman, Doctrinal Intersections, supra note 100, at 1257
("Virtually everyone (except, perhaps, the five justices in the majority in Twombly) regards
plausibility as an ambiguous standard.").
115. Subrin, Contempt for Rules, supra note 84, 578 ("But I think it is incontestable that these
terms-conclusory and plausible-are highly fluid and non-defining, and that different judges
calling on their own common sense, experience-and yes, their political views-will surely
interpret the terms differently in the cases before them."). See also Hearing, supra note 103, at 9
(statement of Prof. Arthur M. Miller).
116. For instance, in a dissent, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit developed a
numerical account of plausibility:
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judicial system, as the application of an ambiguous standard is likely
to be challenged and require attention on appeal.117
Furthermore, moving beyond the question of the legitimacy of
incorporating judges' own lived experience into a pleading standard,
abandoning the familiar "no set of facts" standard creates widespread
confusion among litigants, lower courts and legal academics.118 There
is even confusion over whether the federal forms themselves, which
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 suffice to meet the
requirements of Rule 8, would satisfy the plausibility standard.119
In contrast to this criticism, some have argued that the ambiguity
and grant of discretion embodied in the plausibility standard is
beneficial or at least defensible120 Ultimately, regardless of whether
"judicial experience and common sense" leads to salutary or
detrimental effects, the reality of the plausibility standard is that
litigants must account for the interplay between pleadings and the
characteristics of their judicial audience, and judges must determine
how to apply their judicial experience and common sense-both tasks
that narrative can help accomplish.
In statistics the range of probabilities is from 0 to 1, and therefore encompasses
"sheer possibility" along with "plausibility." It seems (no stronger word is
possible) that what the Court was driving at was that even if the district judge
doesn't think a plaintiffs case is more likely than not to be a winner (that is,
doesn't think p > .5), as long as it is substantially justified that's enough to avert
dismissal.
Swanson v. Citibank N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting). Notably, this
direction to rely on judicial experience and common sense came after well-recognized public
debate over the propriety of judges' own life experiences informing their decisions. See, e.g.,
Margaret M. Zwisler & Amanda P. Reeves, The Search for Clarity in Federal Pleading Standards:
Are We Close to Limiting the Intended (and Unintended) Consequences of Twombly and lqbal?, 13
SEDONA CONF. J. 135, 136 (2012) (noting that "[t]he Senate Judiciary Committee pilloried both
Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor during their confirmation hearings for suggesting that a
judge's own experience should inform his or her decisions").
117. See Hoffman, Doctrinal Intersections, supra note 100, at 1258 (noting that the ambiguity
in the plausibility standard means imposing additional costs on everyone, thus carrying serious
practical and social consequences).
118. See Hearing, supra note 103, at 19 (statement of Prof. Arthur M. Miller) (referring to
"confusion and uncertainties" Twombly and Iqbal have generated).
119. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1, 12
(2009) [hereinafter Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine] ("Do these forms really comply
with the Twombly standard? ... Twombly suggested that conclusory terms could not be made to
do the work of actual fact allegations."); Steinman, supra note 73, at 1310 ("The continued
vitality of classic pre-Twombly authorities (e.g., Form 11 and Swierkiewicz) is in doubt.").
120. See, e.g., Mark Moller, Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 647 (2011) (arguing that
"opaque" decisions like Twombly and Iqbal "create space for lower courts to adopt a blend of
different, conflicting interpretations of a statute (or procedure) -yielding an average result that
compromises, or 'trims,' between competing preferences"); see also Kassem, supra note 105, at
1446 (noting that judicial exercise of discretion is a central part of the American court system).
20 [Vol 26:1
20
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss1/1
2014] Ralph 21
C. The Plausibility Standard Reduces Access To justice
Finally, the plausibility standard has been criticized because
pleading standards are central to justicel21 and the plausibility
standard threatens to restrict access to justice generally. 122 Under this
line of criticism, the new, more demanding plausibility standard is
problematic both because it violates the open spirit of the Federal
Rules123 and because it leads to less effective enforcement and
vindication of important constitutional and other federal civil
rights.124
Critics of the plausibility standard warn that the more demanding
standard will both eliminate meritorious suitsl25 and have a chilling
effect on the filing of suits in the first place126 Overall, critics claim,
there is no reason to think the plausibility standard is so much more
efficient (as compared to the Conley-era formulation) that it is worth
the risk of barring or chilling meritorious claims127
Critics voice a particular concern about losing access to justice in
civil rights cases because the American justice system relies on
private enforcement of civil rights laws.128 Increasing obstacles to
121. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 73, at 1294 ("If a plaintiff seeking judicial redress is
unable to provide an adequate Istatement of the claim' at the pleadings phase, then that claim is
effectively stillborn.").
122. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 94, at 347; Levin, supra note 106, at 146.
123. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) ("If rules of
procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but
should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on
the merits."); see also, e.g., Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 3-4 (noting that the 1938
"Federal Rules reshaped civil litigation to reflect core values of citizen access to the justice
system and adjudication on the merits based on a full disclosure of relevant information");
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 5, at 479-80 (decrying challenge to the "liberal ethos"
of Federal Rules and subsequent jurisprudence in Twombly and Iqbal).
124. Wasserman, supra note 97, at 161 ("The predictable result [of Twombly and Iqbal] will
be a significant decrease in enforcement and vindication of federal constitutional and civil rights,
and of the values and principles underlying those rights.").
125. Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 71 (arguing the plausibility standard "will result
in some possibly meritorious cases being terminated under Rule 12(b)(6), thereby reducing
citizens' ability to employ the nation's courts in a meaningful fashion"); see also A. Benjamin
Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99, 160 (2008)
[hereinafter Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims] (noting that a motion to dismiss based on the
plausibility standard "will weed out claims that are merely suspected of lacking merit rather
than reserving dismissal only for those claims that are certain to lack merit").
126. Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 71 (arguing the plausibility standard "will chill a
potential plaintiff's or lawyer's willingness to institute an action"); Levin, supra note 106, at 152
("[T]he Supreme Court's plausibility standard is extraordinarily vague, making it difficult for a
party to judge whether a potential lawsuit is worth bringing.").
127. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 125 (2011)
("There is... no empirical basis supporting the assumption that heightened pleading standards
[such as 'plausibility'] are more efficient filters than Conley's notice pleading standard.").
128. See Wasserman, supra note 97, at 171; see also id at 174 ("[P]rocedural rules should
support, rather than undermine, plaintiffs who act as private attorneys general and seek to
enforce the Constitution, ensure government accountability, and benefit the public at large.").
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justice for civil rights plaintiffs is of particular concern because the
federal courts, traditionally insulated from majoritarian pressure, are
usually vindicators for those claiming discrimination.129 This concern
is especially serious because contemporary forms of prejudice may be
more subtle than earlier instances, yet no less deserving of
recompense.130 As well, compromising enforcement and deterrence is
at odds with the goals of anti-discrimination laws. 131
The debate over the effect of the plausibility standard on access to
justice is more than academic. Empirical evidence suggests that the
plausibility standard is having a negative effect on plaintiffs,
particularly civil rights plaintiffs; the plausibility standard has had an
effect on dismissal rates of civil cases, including civil rights and
discrimination cases, although the magnitude of the effect is difficult
to pinpoint.132 Additional empirical evidence shows that motions to
dismiss in civil rights cases may be decided differently depending on
the race of the plaintiff and/or the race of the judge.133 As the picture
129. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 151-52 (1980); see also Kassem, supra note 105, at 1445 ("[T]he
courts are minority groups' most natural allies in the United States' tripartite constitutional
arrangement"); Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 125, at 100 ("For some time
now, members of minority or disadvantaged groups in the United States have used the federal
courts as the forum in which they seek remedies for harmful discriminatory conduct and obtain
protection against prospective harm of this kind."). One commentator has argued that two
seminal civil rights cases would have turned out differently under the plausibility standard.
Brooke D. Coleman, What If?. A Study of Seminal Cases As If Decided Under A Twombly/lqbal
Regime, 90 OR. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (2012) (discussing Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). Among other
things, Coleman describes the complaint in Bakke, at four pages, as "sparse." Id. at 1159.
Similarly, Hopkins' complaint, while containing numerous details about her work had very little
factual information that would show she had been discriminated on the basis of sex; Coleman
concludes that "it is unlikely that [Hopkins] could have amended her complaint to add the well-
pleaded facts necessary to successfully state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal." Id. at 1163.
Coleman also suggests that, with respect to a host of key civil rights cases, "there is a good
argument that each of these complaints might not have survived a motion to dismiss in a
Twombly/Iqbal regime." Id. at 1180 n.6.
130. Quintanilla predicts that the plausibility standard will have a "profound" effect on
federal nondiscrimination law, limiting protections against forms of "subtle prejudice" and
"fail[ing] to protect the members of stigmatized groups who most need legal protection against
modern forms of prejudice." Quintanilla, supra note 112, at 59.
131. There is well-documented concern over the potential chilling effect and exclusionary
effect on civil rights and discrimination suits in particular following the plausibility standard.
See, e.g., Malveaux, Front Loading, supra note 93, at 101 ("[T]he new plausibility pleadings
standard compromises civil rights enforcement and deterrence objectives. Potentially
meritorious civil rights claims will be prevented from being heard in federal court, a forum
plaintiffs have historically relied upon for relief. Meanwhile, those who discriminate will enjoy a
windfall.").
132. See, e.g., Malveaux, TheJury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at 720 (noting that "if potentially
meritorious civil rights and employment discrimination cases are dismissed prematurely, law
enforcement and deterrence will be sacrificed for expediency and efficiency," and concluding
that "[tihe answer to this question is that we don't know yet").
133. Studying cases in the 18 months before and after lqbal, Quintanilla found statistically
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of motions to dismiss post-Twombly and Iqbal is coming into focus, it
is not encouraging for civil rights plaintiffs.
Following Twombly and Iqbal, more defendants are filing motions
under Rule 12(b)(6) (to dismiss for failure to state a claim).134 The
rate of filing for motions to dismiss has also increased for civil rights
cases.135 There is general agreement that more 12(b)(6) motions are
being granted post-Iqbal,136 and several studies have found that civil
rights and discrimination cases have been particularly compromised
by the plausibility standard. 137 One commentator has noticed that the
significant increases in dismissal of African-American plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination in
the workplace and of similar claims from African-American pro se plaintiffs. Quintanilla, supra
note 112, at 5, 40 ("The dismissal rate increased from 20.5% pre-Twombly to 54.6% post-lqbal
for Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination-a 2.66 times increase. ... For Black pro se
plaintiffs' claims, the dismissal rate increased from 32.0% before Twombly to 67.3% under lqbal,
representing a 2.10 times increase."). He also found a "marginally significant trend" showing
white and African-American judges apply lqbal differently. Id. at 5, 40 ("White judges dismissed
Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination at a higher rate (57.5%) than did Black judges
(33.3%)."). Quintanilla finds that application of Twombly and Iqbal have resulted in "increased
dismissals of Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination," and suggests that it "is likely that
the same natural psychological processes that disadvantage Blacks are operating against other
stereotyped groups at the pleading stage." Id. at 60.
134. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL:
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 8 (2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf; see
also Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and lqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the Federaljudicial Center's
Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) [hereinafter Hoffman, Twombly and
lqbal's Measure] (finding that "the rate of dismissal motions that were filed increased
substantially" after Iqbal, as compared to the time period before Twombly); Malveaux, TheJury Is
Still Out, supra note 93, at 727-28.
135. See CECIL, supra note 134, at 8; see also Malveaux, The jury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at
728. Although the study by the Federal judicial Center (FJC) found no statistically significant
increase in the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted post-plausibility, CECIL, supra note
134, at 21, the FJC study does not capture cases that have not been filed out of a chilling impact
of the new plausibility standard. See Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure, supra note 134, at
27-30; see also Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of lqbal's Impact on
12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 609 (2012). The FJC study also does not reflect whether
cases were dismissed for factual insufficiency. Hoffman, Twombly and lqbal's Measure, supra
note 134, at 30-31. Finally, the study cannot reflect whether cases that were indeed dismissed
were in fact meritorious. Id. at 30. See also Moore, supra, at 654 ("Does the elevated rate of
granting 12(b)(6) motions under Iqbal happen mainly in those cases where it 'should' happen? I
cannot make a normative judgment here as to whether the cases that were entirely dismissed on
the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion under Iqbal were cases that should be allowed to go forward as a
matter of right.") (internal quotation omitted); Malveaux, The jury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at
733-39.
136. See CECIL, supra note 134, at 22; see also Malveaux, The jury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at
739; Moore, supra note 135, at 605.
137. See Raymond H. Brescia, The lqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 284 (2012) (finding an
"lqbal effect" in civil rights actions involving allegations of employment and/or housing
discrimination; "[n]ot only were cases dismissed at a higher rate since Iqbal, but also, plaintiffs
were forced to defend themselves on these grounds far more often than before, meaning
significant transactions costs"); Moore, supra note 135, at 605 (finding a statistically significant
increased "risk of a 12(b)(6) motion being granted without leave to amend, compared to being
denied... under Iqbal than under Conley," greater "odds of the case being entirely dismissed
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lower courts are not deploying the "plausibility" standard the way the
Supreme Court ostensibly intended; while they are dismissing more
cases, they are not analyzing the plausibility standard in a substantive
way.138
It is worth noting that the Twombly and Iqbal cases and the
plausibility standard are all part of a larger trend towards limiting
access throughout the federal court system.139 As well, although most
commentary focuses on the Supreme Court's agency in creating these
negative effects, others have identified that the Supreme Court's
pronouncement of the plausibility standard only reflects the adoption
of practices that had already been thriving in the lower federal
courts.140
Of course, the foregoing criticisms overlap and interplay with one
another. For instance, the restriction of access to justice relates to the
problem of information asymmetry, in that the heightened pleading
standard, when combined with information asymmetry, exhibits a
chilling effect on lawsuits.141
As discussed further below, each of these concerns can be resolved
by applying narrative theory to the plausibility puzzle. This is a
upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend ... under lqbal than under Conley,"
and a higher rate of dismissal "post-Iqbal than pre-Twombly" for constitutional civil rights
cases); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 120 (2010) [hereinafter Seiner,
Pleading Disability] (finding "a higher percentage of district court opinions granting motions to
dismiss in the disability context in the year following the Bell Atlantic decision compared to the
year prior to the Supreme Court case"); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2009)
[hereinafter Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly] (finding "a higher rate of dismissals in Title VII
opinions issued after Twombly"); see also Malveaux, The jury Is Still Out, supra note 93, at 741-
43.
138. See Brescia, supra note 137, at 285. Brescia studied civil rights actions involving
allegations of employment and/or housing discrimination and specifically considered "how
lower courts are deploying the plausibility standard," both by looking at courts' mention of more
plausible alternatives and at "the extent to which judges appear to be applying their experience
and common sense to solve pleading challenges." Id Brescia found that district courts "rarely
referred to the plausibility standard in any substantive way at all"; "did not deploy a 'more
plausible' rubric to test the specificity of pleadings"; and "almost never-at least not explicitly-
referred to their own experience and common sense, as urged by the Court, in testing those
pleadings." Id. at 285. Nonetheless, Brescia concluded that "[t]he fact that district courts did not
use Twombly or Iqbal in the manner contemplated by the Court, yet dismissed these cases more
frequently, suggests that at least some judges may feel emboldened to dismiss cases after Iqbal
regardless of the standard they may or may not invoke." Id at 286.
139. Levin, supra note 106, at 146-48.
140. Id. at 149 ("At most, the Supreme Court has been a lag indicator for what was already
happening in the lower courts."). See also Fairman, Notice Pleading, supra note 10, at 998-1059
(noting range of cases in which trial and appellate courts imposed heightened pleading
standards in contravention of explicit Supreme Court precedent).
141. See Hoffman, Doctrinal Intersections, supra note 100, at 1263 ("[B]ecause of
information asymmetries, when a heightened pleading standard is imposed, some meritorious
cases will not be filed and, further, some that are filed will be dismissed (or settled for marginal
value).").
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position few commentators have explored. Reacting to the new
standard, Professor Miller predicted that "we may be entering an age
of storytelling pleading."142 However, he also asked whether the tales
"will ... be happy or sad ones."143 As this Article shall explain in the
next two sections, the application of narrative theory and storytelling
techniques to pleading in the post-Twombly and Iqbal world can
ensure that the story of plausibility pleading has a better chance at a
happy ending.
Ill. NARRATIVE THEORY AND NARRATIVE TOOLS
Narrative theory answers the complex question of why narratives
are persuasive. Narrative theory also seeks to explain the
characteristics that every narrative possesses and how those
characteristics function. The persuasive characteristics of narratives
imbue narratives with plausibility. For this and numerous other
reasons, narrative theory holds great promise for meeting the
plausibility standard.
A narrative is, in short, a story.144 Narrative theory studies not only
the composition, but also the transmission and reception of stories.145
The concept of the "narrative transaction" focuses on the effect of the
story on the audience, recognizing that, in understanding a story,
"all ... readers and listeners ... have to work with is the presentation
of events in the vehicle of narrative discourse."146
This Article will explore the characteristics of narrative that make it
so persuasive, and then will briefly recount the elements that must be
present in a narrative, as well as narrative techniques that can enrich
a narrative's persuasiveness.
A. Narrative Rationality: What Makes Narratives Persuasive?
Narratives are an innately human way of presenting and
understanding experiences.147 Cognitive research reveals that humans
142. Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 36.
143. Id.
144. By way of more detailed definition, a narrative is "a telling of some true or fictitious
event or connected sequence of events, recounted by a narrator to a narratee... in which the
events are selected and arranged in a particular order (the plot)." CHRIS BALDICK, THE CONCISE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 145 (1990).
145. See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in
LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN LAW 135, 143 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
146. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN LAW 14, 17 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
147. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 114 (2000) ("[N]o
culture, no language group is without stories.... It seems almost as if humankind is unable to
get on without stories. Knowing how to tell them and to comprehend them may be part of the
2014] 25
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make sense of experiences by drawing on "interpretive frameworks"
called "schemas."148 A schema is a framework that contains general
knowledge about a particular subject, including relationships between
events and occurrences.149 Schemas allow an individual to process
information about his social environment, and they guide perception,
memory and inference.1so
Individuals combine schemas to tell stories (or narratives), which
function as "an interpretative framework in which multiple schema
are operating at once."151 Cognitive scientists have discovered that
humans have a tendency to "organize experience into narrative
form."152
Similarly, on a societal level, groups tell stories that give meaning to
complex experiences, through the cultural concept of "stock
stories."153 Humans draw on a pool of "stock stories" when faced with
a new experience154 Stock stories can be considered cultural master
stories or myths that give meaning to social experiences.155 "Stock
stories" assist a person in understanding the new experience, by
giving him or her tools to assess and interpret the circumstances and
shape judgment regarding the experience.156 Thus, stock stories form
an "essential part" of a culture's and an individual's judgment about
the meaning of events or experiences.157
There are, broadly, two opinions among scholars of narrative about
why narrative is so universal. One camp concludes that narratives are
"endogenous"-in other words, that narrative is inherent either in the
human survival kit."); David Herman, Introduction to NARRATIVE THEORY AND THE COGNITIVE
SCIENCES 1, 2 (David Herman ed. 2003) ("[S]tories are found in every culture and subculture and
can be viewed as a basic human strategy for coming to terms with time, process, and change."); J.
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING:
J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 57-59 (2008).
148. Jennifer Sheppard, What If the Big Bad Wolf in All Those Fairy Tales Was just
Misunderstood?: Techniques for Maintaining Narrative Rationality While Altering Stock Stories
That Are Harmful to Your Client's Case, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 187, 190 (2012).
149. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures
on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1133 (2004).
150. Id
151. See Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and In a Galaxy Far, Far
Away: Using Narrative To Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Appellate
Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 260 (2009).
152. Id.at261.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 257.
155. Id.; Sheppard, supra note 148, at 192.
156. Sheppard, supra note 151, at 257; see also Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge
Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and
Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 264 (2009) (explaining that
humans "make sense out of new experiences by placing them into categories and cognitive
frames called schema or scripts that emerge from prior experience").
157. Sheppard, supra note 148, at 193.
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structure of language or in the structure of the mind.1s8 Others take
the view that the source of narrative is not within mental or linguistic
structures, but rather that narrative arises within cultures as a way of
sharing human experience.159 Under this second view of narrative,
narratives model "characteristic plights" and "aspirations" of a
culture, and allow the culture to translate its experiences into
language, representing the ordinary order of things in the culture and
the proper responses to threats to that order.160 Narratives make it
possible to share experiences, but they also have a practical appeal, in
that they give members of the culture ways to predict, resolve, and
understand events and conflicts in life.161
Regardless of the theory one adopts about the origin of narrative,
there is universal acceptance that narratives are highly persuasive.162
Three characteristics of narrative in particular make them persuasive:
(1) narrative coherence; (2) narrative correspondence; and (3)
narrative fidelity.163
1. Narrative Coherence
Narrative coherence deals with the "integrity of a story as a
whole"164; it encompasses the structural elements of the story,
including scene, act, agent, agency and purpose, and the completeness
158. Rideout, supra note 147, at 58. See also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 147, at 115
(Endogenous theories of narrative claim "that narrative is inherent either in the nature of the
human mind, in the nature of language, or in those supposed programs alleged to run our
nervous systems.").
159. AMSTERDAM& BRUNER, supra note 147, at 116-17.
160. Id. at 117.
161. Id.
162. Narrative goes beyond pure logic, but it encompasses logical characteristics. WALTER
FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE, AND ACTION
48 (1987) ("[N]arrative rationality does not deny the limited but necessary use of technical logic
in assessing inferences or implicative forms that occur in human communication.").
163. Drawing from a deep well of narrative and communication theory, Rideout has
identified the characteristics of narrative that make them persuasive. See Rideout, supra note
147, at 56; see also FISHER, supra note 162, at 5-6. The first two characteristics, coherence and
correspondence, are formal properties that relate to the way the parts of a narrative relate to
one another. Rideout, supra note 147, at 56. The final characteristic, narrative fidelity, can be
considered substantive because it concerns not the structure of the narrative but its content Id
Narrative fidelity encompasses a story's accuracy, with a particular concern on the judgment of
the audience. Id
164. FISHER, supra note 162, at 105. Narrative coherence concerns the way in which a story
is told. See Rideout, supra note 147, at 64; see also W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 89 (1981)
("[Tihe way in which a story is told will have considerable bearing on its perceived credibility
regardless of the actual truth status of the story."). Similarly, Fisher considered narrative
coherence a matter of "probability" and likened it to asking "whether a story 'hangs together."'
FISHER, supra note 162, at 47.
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and adequacy of the relationships between those elements.165
Narrative coherence has two components: internal consistency (how
well a story's parts "fit together") and completeness (how adequate
the sum of the total parts of the story seems, or whether there are any
gaps in the story).166
Internal consistency exists when the parts of a story relate to one
another in a "quasi-logical" way; that is, the parts of the story do not
contradict each other.167 Internal consistency depends, in part, upon
inferences made by the audience member.168 When a reader or
listener encounters a narrative, she will put together the key elements
of the narrative and supply inferences between those elements169
That is, she will make inferences to connect these related parts of the
story, as long as the parts seem consistent with one another. 170 On the
other hand, where relationships between the key elements of a story
seem ambiguous or contradictory, the story is internally inconsistent,
and less persuasive.171
To be coherent, a story must also be complete.172 A complete story
will contain enough information to allow the audience member
reasonably to make inferences that "yield a clear interpretation for
the story."173 Among other things, a coherent story will not lack or
ignore important facts, obvious counterarguments or apparently
relevant issues.174
Narrative coherence has a significant effect on the persuasiveness of
a story.175 In fact, theories about narrative coherence posit that the
way in which a story is told can prevail over the evidence that
supports the story.17 6 Narrative coherence enhances the perceived
165. See BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 89.
166. Rideout, supra note 147, at 64.
167. See BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 58 (1988); Rideout, supra
note 147, at 64-65.
168. Rideout, supra note 147, at 65.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 65; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 125-41.
171. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 168 (1999) ("[A] story may be implausible
simply because the relationships among the key story elements are indeterminate or
ambiguous.").
172. See Rideout, supra note 147, at 76 ("The other aspect of a story's coherence is its
completeness, the extent to which the structure of the story contains all of its expected parts. A
story may be internally consistent and yet remain unconvincing if it is incomplete.").
173. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 44-45; see also Rideout, supra note 147, at 65.
174. FISHER, supra note 162, at 47. Fisher also saw that "characterological coherence" was
important to a coherent narrative. Id "Coherence in life and in literature requires that
characters behave characteristically." Id. Thus, Fisher placed great importance on "determining
a character's motives" as a "prerequisite" to belief in a story. Id
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credibility of a story "regardless of the actual truth status of the
story."177
2. Narrative Correspondence
Narratives are also persuasive because they embody a second
property, that of correspondence. Narrative correspondence requires
that a story fit with what the audience understands about what could
happen in the ordinary course of the world.178 Narrative
correspondence "is the feature of narratives that lends them much of
their plausibility, that makes them structurally convincing."179 Indeed,
some narrative theorists refer to the property of correspondence as
"external factual plausibility"-asking "Could [the story] have
happened that way?"180
Assessing narrative correspondence requires a comparison
between the content of the story and the other stories that make up
the stock stories of the culture, within the social knowledge of the
judge or jury. 181 Audiences test the information in stories against a
culture's shared understanding about human actions and the
relationships of events to one another.182 Such a comparison allows
the audience to determine the plausibility of a story.18a When judging
177. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 89. Bennett and Feldman, whose work focuses
on storytelling in the courtroom, found that the structural characteristics of stories, embodied in
narrative coherence, were particularly important when "facts or documentary evidence are
absent." Id. Bennett and Feldman give the example of politics, "when leaders present accounts
of political events to the general public." Id The structure, or coherence, of a story is also
important "when a collection of facts or evidence is subject to competing interpretations." Id.
They make the important point that in cases with competing facts or evidence, "it may not be the
evidence that sways final judgment; judgment hinges on the structure of interpretation that
provides the best fit for the evidence." Id. at 89-90.
178. See Rideout, supra note 147, at 66.
179. J. Christopher Rideout, A Twice Told Tale: Plausibility and Narrative Coherence in
judicial Storytelling, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 67, 71 (2013).
180. BURNS, supra note 171, at 168.
181. Rideout relates this idea of correspondence to plausibility, noting that "[a] story will
appear plausible to the extent that it manifests similarity with some model of narrative which
exists within the stock of social knowledge." Rideout, supra note 147, at 67. The notion of a
stock story is a familiar one in narrative theory. For instance, Amsterdam and Bruner describe
the stock stories of our culture as "scripts," involving "familiar characters taking appropriate
actions in typical settings"; in other words: "recurrent situations in our lives." AMSTERDAM &
BRUNER, supra note 147, at 45. A script tells "how things actually happen and how things should
happen." Id. "Established" scripts or "stock scripts" represent the "background knowledge of
the culture"; they "embody normal expectations and normal practice," such as what happens
when one goes to a restaurant (the waiter waits on you). Id at 121. A narrative is a story that
illustrates "what happens when a script is thrown off track." Id. at 45. Bennett and Feldman call
this the "logic of ordinary discourse," based on the "rules of empirical relationship that we know
to hold true in the everyday world." BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 56.
182. Rideout, supra note 179, at 72-73.
183. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 48-50. Bennett and Feldman write that the
audience for a story will assimilate the information in the story and test it against "the listener's
2014] 29
29
Ralph: Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand and
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
a story, the audience looks at whether the relationships developed
and inferences drawn are actually consistent with these stock stories
and with their own "common sense."184
Narrative correspondence relates to possibility-what "could"
happen or "typically" happens according to cultural stock stories-
and not to truth in reality.1ss The persuasive value of a narrative's
correspondence "derives not from the content of the narrative as an
empirical description of social reality, but rather from the social and
cultural presuppositions that it conjures and with which it coheres,
structurally."186 Indeed, "the plausibility of stories has little to do
with... their actual truth status."187 When narrative matches up to a
stock story, the correspondence between the narrative and the
familiar stock story adds plausibility and persuasiveness to the
narrative.188
3. Narrative Fidelity
Finally, to be persuasive, a story must possess narrative fidelity.189
Narrative fidelity, the third persuasive characteristic of narrative, goes
beyond the formal features of narrative-beyond a narrative's
structure and its correspondence to the stock stories of the culture-
and concerns the narrative's similarity to what an audience member
knows to be true in the real world.190 Narrative fidelity differs from
narrative correspondence because it relates not to stock stories,
which are transmitted through a culture socially, but rather to an
audience's real, personal experience of the world.191 Narrative fidelity
refers not to the audience's belief in the actual truth of a story, but the
audience's sense that the story "represent[s] accurate assertions
use of the vast store of background knowledge about social life." Id. at 50. The background
knowledge allows the audience to "fill in the framework of connections" as they make inferences
that will help them interpret the story. Id.
184. BURNS, supra note 171, at 169. This "common sense" is "a store of empirical
generalizations concerning human behavior, the 'web of belief or 'prejudgments"' that are
usually "implicit" and "uncriticized" in our everyday world. Id. A story's plausibility depends on
the degree of correspondence between a narrative and a "preexistent common sense (viewed as
an inventory of factual generalizations with previously assigned probabilities)." Id.
185. Rideout, supra note 147, at 67.
186. Rideout, supra note 179, at 72.
187. JACKSON, supra note 167, at 63.
188. Id. at 68.
189. Id
190. Id. According to Fisher, the narrative principle of fidelity depends on "whether the
stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives." FIsHER,
supra note 162, at 64.
191. Rideout, supra note 147, at 70. In Fisher's words, narrative fidelity is a matter of
whether the parts of a story "represent accurate assertions about social reality and thereby
constitute good reasons for belief or action." FISHER, supra note 162, at 105.
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about social reality."192 Narrative fidelity thus depends, in part, on an
audience's "practical judgment"193 based on its "intuition of
experience."194
To yield these powerful characteristics of narrative, a story should
be told in a way that facilitates the audience member in making the
various inferences required for the tale to be persuasive.195 Below,
this Article recounts the elements that a narrative must possess and
surveys particular narrative techniques that help elicit the audience
member's interpretation that a story possesses narrative coherence,
correspondence and fidelity.196
B. Narrative Techniques: How Is a Story Told?
A narrative requires a plot, complete with beginning, middle and
end.197 As the plot progresses, it must include the following elements:
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate
ordinariness of things
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of
circumstances attributable to human agency or susceptible to
change by human intervention,
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which
succeed or fail,
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new
(transformed) steady state is created,
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of
the tale that has been told into the here-and-now of the telling
through some coda.198
These events must be organized into a particular structure to be
cognizable as a narrative rather than a list of things.199
Beyond the presence of these basic elements, use of narrative
192. FISHER, supra note 162, at 105.
193. Rideout, supra note 147, at 74.
194. Id. (quoting Justice Holmes in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585,
598 (1907)).
195. See BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 164, at 41.
196. See id. at 64-65.
197. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 147, at 113.
198. Id. at 113-14. A narrative also needs "a case of human-like characters, being capable of
willing their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings." Id. at 113. While
it seems a truism that any complaint is going to have a cast of human or "human-like" characters,
such is not always the case (for example, the Court's discussion of market operations in the
Twombly opinion).
199. Herman, supra note 147, at 2 ("[Wlhat makes... a narrative instead of a mere
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techniques, such as sequence, character development, point of view,
and detail, can help the writer to create the powerful characteristics of
narrative-coherence, correspondence and fidelity-described
above.200
The writer's decision about the order in which a story's events will
be presented affects the persuasiveness and plausibility of the
narrative.201 One way to begin a story is with the initial steady state
(see above), moving in a default linear structure through the
remaining parts of the narrative: in other words, the writer would
then move to the disruption, and on through the elements of a story as
set out above202 However, other organizations may be more effective
and persuasive than that linear structure203 Altering the linear
structure can effectively focus a reader on a particular fact in a story,
or can hook a reader's attention204 Effective use of sequence for
persuasion can also be achieved through including a short summary
of the story at the beginning of a narrative, or by following different
characters through events in convergent narratives.205
Character development helps the story or narrative feel real to the
audience; an audience will experience greater empathy for some
characters that feel authentiC.206 Particularly in light of the existence
of "correspondence bias," a documented human propensity to over-
attribute conduct to an individual's character and de-emphasize the
circumstances that gave rise to the conduct, it is important to develop
the character of a client or other legal actor whose actions might
incline an audience to feel unsympathetic towards him or her.207
Character can be established directly or indirectly.208 To establish
character directly, a writer can describe a character or party's
200. For the discussion of these techniques, I owe a great deal to Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R.
Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 3 (2009).





206. Id. at 30.
207. Lawrence M. Solan has explained the "correspondence bias" as: "[t]he propensity to
overstate the role of character and to understate the circumstances in which an individual acts."
Lawrence M. Solan, Intuition Versus Algorithm: The Case of Forensic Authorship Attribution, 21 J.L.
& POL'Y 551, 576 (2013); see also Lawrence M. Solan, Lawyers As Insincere (but Truthful) Actors,
36 J. LEGAL PROF. 487, 490 (2012) ("People tend to overestimate the extent to which the behavior
of others stems from their personal characteristics, and to underestimate the extent to which the
behavior is a normal reaction to circumstances."). With "correspondence bias" in mind,
advocates may also be able to encourage audiences to view the opposing party's actions as
representative of that party's character, rather than as the product of complex circumstances.
208. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 200, at 31.
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thoughts, appearance, body language, et cetera.209 To establish
character indirectly, the writer can describe actions and words of the
character or party.210
The point of view established by the writer will determine through
which character's/party's eyes the audience views the story.211
Depending on the level of "psychic distance" between the reader and
the narration of the story, the writer can create greater empathy and
reliability in the narrator.212
Detail is another ingredient crucial to development of a persuasive
narrative.213 Specific factual detail, whether an individual detail or a
multitude of elaborate detail, can have very effective persuasive
power. 214
Based on this background in narrative theory and narrative tools,
this Article now moves to a discussion of how narrative can solve the
problems associated with the plausibility pleading standard.
IV. How NARRATIVE THEORY RESOLVES THE PROBLEMS OF PLAUSIBILITY
PLEADING
To scholars of law and narrative, the promise of narrative theory for
understanding the plausibility standard should come as no surprise.
Narrative pervades the law.215 Narrative is also highly persuasive in
law.216 Indeed, our legal system depends on narrative.217 From the
stories told through testimony at trial to the narrative recounting of
facts in a judicial opinion, stories are everywhere in the law.218
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 37.
212. See, e.g., Cathren Kohlert-Page, Come A Little Closer So I Can See You My Pretty: The Use
and Limits of Fiction Techniques for Establishing an Empathetic Point of View in Appellate Briefs,
80 UMKC L. REV. 399, 404 (2011). For an example of varying degrees of "psychic distance," see
JOHN GARDNER, THE ART OF FICTION, 111-24 (1991). Including details also creates a unique point of
view, which can affect a reader's view of the parties or characters in the narrative. Id at 403
("Details can increase the closeness the reader feels with the viewpoint party or character.").
Chronology also helps establish strong point of view. See Kohlert-Page, supra, at 416. Including
pre-conflict facts may help the reader understand the party or character's view of the conflict,
increasing empathy for that character or party. Id. at 416.
213. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 200, at 40.
214. Id.at41.
215. Peter Brooks, Narrative in and of the Law, in A COMPANION TO NARRATIVE THEORY 415,
416 (James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz eds., 2005) (describing "the pervasive presence of
narrative throughout the law").
216. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 147, at 110.
217. Our justice system, at its core, depends on storytelling: the concept of notice and the
opportunity to be heard. E.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Diana Lopez Jones, Stock
Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape ofjustice for Native Americans Involved in Interparental
Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 457, 459 (2012).
218. Brooks, supra note 215, at 416 ("Trial lawyers know that they need to tell stories, that
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However, law as a discipline is sometimes criticized for insisting
that narrative has little place in its system of objective rules.219
Professor Brooks writes that law has not explicitly recognized that
narrative is one of its important tools; in fact, Brooks calls narrative
the "untheorized ... content" of the law.220 The "plausibility" standard,
with its use of metaphors like weight, heft and a precise "line" across
which complaints must be nudged, shares in law's history of attempts
to be (or appear) objective.221
Although the law has long embodied the notion that questions
about what happened in a particular case can be answered by some
reference to "free-standing facts," the legal academy is coming to a
greater recognition that the sense of what happened in a particular
case depends in great part on the choice of a narrative.222 As a result,
there have been calls for a greater focus on narrative in the law
generally223 and in the complaint specifically.224 However, no article
has yet considered the possibility for narrative specifically to respond
to Twombly and Iqbal's call for plausibility in pleadings, and no
discussion of the implications of narrative for the plausibility
standard has emerged.
Despite law's frequent denial of its narrative content, narrative
theory and storytelling merit particular attention from practitioners,
judges and the legal academy at this time of plausibility pleading. As
the evidence they present in court must be bound together and unfolded in narrative form."); see
also Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in Law, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN
LAW 2, 5 (Paul Gewirtz & Peter Brooks eds., 1996) (arguing that "[v]irtually everyone in the legal
culture," from a "trial lawyer presenting her case to a court or jury," to "a judge announcing his
findings about what happened in the case," to a "law professor writing an article" is using
"storytelling" to "mak[e] an argument and try[] to persuade").
219. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 215, at 416 ("[O]ver the centuries the professionalization of
law and legal education has tended to obscure the rhetorical roots of legal practice-which
might now be viewed as something of a scandal in a field that wants to believe that it is rooted in
irrefutable principles and that it proceeds by reason alone.").
220. Id. at 415. Brooks writes that, to the extent the law does recognize its entanglement
with narrative, it "reacts to [narrative] with unease and suspicion, so that the neglect of
narrative as a legal category is possibly an act of repression, an effort to keep the narrativity of
the law out of sight." Id
221. Cf id.; Eichhorn, supra note 86, at 969 (arguing metaphors in Iqbal were an attempt to
portray the decision as "simply a fair and consistent application of precedent").
222. According to Amsterdam and Bruner, the law has long embodied the notion that
questions about what happened to give rise to a particular case "can be answered by examining
free-standing factual data selected on grounds of their logical pertinency." AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
supra note 147, at 111. However, as Amsterdam and Bruner explain, "increasingly we are
coming to recognize that both the questions and answers in matters of 'fact' depend largely upon
one's choice (considered or unconsidered) of some overall narrative as best describing what
happened or how the world works." Id. at 111.
223. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 215, at 423 (explaining that "law... needs a narratology"
and encouraging attention to "not only how these stories are constructed and told, but also how
they are listened to, received, reacted to, how they ask to be acted upon").
224. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 200, at 47-48.
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Professor Gewirtz has explained, "[t]he goal of storytelling in law is to
persuade an official decisionmaker that one's story is true, to win the
case, and thus to invoke the coercive force of the state on one's
behalf."225 As scholars, lawyers and judges attempt to understand and
comply with the plausibility standard from Twombly and /qbal, they
should consider the possibilities and promise of narrative for
explaining the standard and providing a method to implement it.
Narrative theory's focus on the narrative transaction and the
reception by the audience is particularly appropriate for this context
because of the high stakes in law generally, and at the motion to
dismiss phase in particular.
A. A Narrative Account of Plausibility
In all the commentary on plausibility, the idea that Twombly and
Iqbal were the Court's requests for more narrative in pleadings has
not been articulated, nor has that idea been fully integrated with
narrative theory. Only a handful of courts and commentators have
explicitly tied the idea of plausibility to storytelling.226 However, the
decisions are a natural fit for the application of narrative theory and,
as shown below, cases that are surviving the plausibility standard at
the motion to dismiss phase utilize well-recognized narrative
techniques.
Narrative theory teaches that narratives possess plausibility to the
extent they are both internally coherent and externally consistent
with what an audience knows to be true about the way the world
works. By requesting that pleaders demonstrate, through non-
conclusory factual allegations, a plausible claim for relief, the Supreme
Court in Twombly and Iqbal asked litigants-in clear terms, although
not explicitly-to rely to a greater degree on narrative in pleadings. If
pleaders engage in storytelling to a greater degree, utilizing the kinds
of narrative techniques discussed above, they will stand a better
chance of putting forth a claim that reaches the threshold of
plausibility.
One way to enhance plausibility through the use of narrative is to
include greater factual detail. That factual precision lends plausibility
is well recognized, both in the narrative theory literature227 and the
225. Gewirtz, supra note 218, at 5.
226. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Miller, Double
Play, supra note 82, at 36 ("[W]e may be entering an age of storytelling pleading. But will the
tales be happy or sad ones? The answer may lie in the eye of the beholder.").
227. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 212, at 57 (describing history of including detail in
literature); Rideout, supra note 147, at 64.
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legal literature.228 Indeed, the Twombly opinion has been criticized for
not being explicit enough that it essentially required more factual
specificity.229
In fact, in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court was not demanding bare
factual detail only. Factual detail is one narrative tool that will help
create plausibility, but it is not the sole tool at lawyers' disposal. The
use of sequence, character development, and point of view, along with
the inclusion of factual detail, also merit careful attention230 Narrative
techniques are important to complaint drafters and judges assessing
complaints because they combine to create plausibility through the
embodiment of narrative rationality.
B. How Narrative Theory Answers the Specific Criticisms of Plausibility
Pleading
Understanding the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and
Iqbal as requesting a new focus on narrative also helps resolve the
main complaints raised by the cases and the plausibility pleading
standard.
First and perhaps most importantly, narrative theory assists
plaintiffs with the "Catch-22" in which they find themselves,
particularly civil rights and discrimination plaintiffs. The set of
narrative tools available for plaintiffs can help them make the most of
the information they have to render a claim plausible. This is
particularly useful when a plaintiff is filing a claim that relies on
information outside her purview, either because it is in defendant's
physical possession or because it involves defendant's motivation or
state of mind. For instance, of the ultimate allegations in
discrimination complaint, any direct allegation of the defendant's
mindset or motivation, i.e., that he acted with discriminatory animus,
cannot survive the first Twombly step (which requires a court to
disregard conclusory legal allegations).231 Such ultimate issues invoke
Wittgenstein's seventh thesis, "[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof
228. See, e.g., Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (but Poorly Drafted) and lqbal Will Be
Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. 709, 734 (2012) ("[T]he relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility is somewhat intuitive... A complaint drafted with factual precision and detail tends
to signal that the pleader is telling an accurate story.... The more factual specificity, the more
plausible is the truth of what is stated.").
229. Id. ("[T]he Twombly opinion is somewhat ambiguous as to the relationship between
plausibility and factual specificity.").
230. See supra notes 207-224 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1642 (noting that a civil rights plaintiff "must plead
not only the harm done to her but also the motivation," thanks to Twombly and Iqbal's discarding
of "conclusory" legal allegations; a plaintiff cannot merely allege that the adverse employment
action, for instance, was motivated by discrimination, as it would be a "formulaic recitation of
the elements" of the cause of action).
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one must be silent."232 Rather than bluntly identifying a defendant's
state of mind, the plaintiff must approach showing mindset or
intention obliquely, through facts, as any other writer would.233 A
narrative that includes rich, substantial detail, careful sequencing, and
characterization can shed light on a defendant's state of mind or
intention without relying on "conclusory" statements about that
mindset.
Indeed, narrative theory recognizes that the way in which a story is
told creates an effect in its reader that is persuasive, if done well,
regardless of the truth status of the story. By creating a narrative that
is internally coherent in terms of structure and externally consistent
with the stock stories in our culture, the plaintiff can meet the
plausibility requirement. Thus, to the extent that the Court has
imposed a higher standard on pleaders through the plausibility
standard, narrative helps overcome it. Whether one understands the
plausibility standard as more demanding than the Conley "no-set-of-
facts" formulation or whether one believes the Court made no changes
to civil pleading standards, a greater focus on narrative helps
plaintiffs capture and harness the potential of the complaint for
storytelling.234
Second, greater focus on narrative also resolves concerns about the
subjectivity and ambiguity of the plausibility pleading standard.
Understanding plausibility as a function of narrative gives judges and
litigants greater direction about where the line of plausibility lies. As
this article has explained, narrative theory understands stories as
persuasive and plausible to the extent that they have certain
characteristics, including structural coherence and correspondence
with a culture's "common sense" social knowledge of stock stories.235
Understanding "judicial experience and common sense" not as
idiosyncratic personal experiences but as appeals to the stories of our
common culture also alleviates some of the worries associated with
that directive.236 Understanding the term in a narrative sense means
232. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUs LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 7, at 189 (C.K. Ogden ed. &
trans., 1922).
233. Cf Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 85, at 860. Bone suggests that the
Court's reference to "formulaic recitations" might tell us "that the defect [in lqbal's complaint]
has to do with how closely the allegation tracks some standard way of expressing the legal
element," but concludes that the legalistic recitation of lqbal's claims could not be the problem
because "it is not clear what other language the plaintiff could have used and still conveyed his
meaning clearly." Id
234. See, e.g., Fajans & Falk, supra note 200, at 47-54.
235. See infra Section III.A.
236. On the subject of judicial experience, Henry S. Noyes offers a distinction based on a
"careful review of the meaning of 'judicial experience' in the Supreme Court's opinions." Henry S.
Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: lqbal, Twombly, and the Application of
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that the judge should assess plausibility not in relation to his or her
own beliefs about the way the world works, but rather in a more
general way that our culture understands actions to be ordered and
situations to play out.
Understanding plausibility as a function of narrative holds unique
promise for those plaintiffs who bring civil rights and discrimination
claims. Use of narrative tools can help plaintiffs to develop a story that
will demonstrate to the audience that their claim is plausible,
regardless of whether the audience shares the teller's precise life
experiences. A well-crafted narrative that is conscious of its own
narrativity will take into account the receiving end of the narrative
transaction, and successfully tap into an available stock story to
increase plausibility.
The limitations that available schema or stock stories place on the
tales that can be told may present a concerning implication for
reliance on narrative: in its dependence on schema, narrative shows
its possibilities as well as its limits.237 The notion that one cannot
understand a story without the proper underlying schema to process
it is ubiquitous in narrative theory.238 This principle demonstrates the
common criticisms of the directive to rely on judges' common sense
and judicial experience-if judges lack experience or notions of
certain things, they will be unable to see allegations related to those
Judicial Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 859 (2012). Rather than "assum[ing] that the application
of judicial experience requires a district court to make a subjective determination of the merits
of the claim based on that judge's vision of reality," Noyes suggests, observers should note that
"the application of judicial experience requires a district court to refer to objective information,
albeit extraneous to the complaint, to inform itself of the 'truth' of the factual picture painted by
the plaintiff in the complaint," including knowledge of experts and commentators and the
"experience of the courts as manifest through the results of earlier cases." Id Noyes writes that
the district courts will "develop a common law of federal pleading standards that will be
improved and refined over time." Id. Noyes concludes that "consideration of information
beyond that alleged in the complaint, even where it calls for a purely objective determination,
permits trial courts a significant amount of discretion" that is inconsistent with the adversarial
system. Id at 898. Cf In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2010)
(identifying "a federal common law doctrine of pleading in complex cases, announced in
Twombly').
237. See Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN LAw 24,
36 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) ("A story also invites more stories, stories that
challenge the first one, or embellish it, or recast it. This, too, is a virtue to be copied.").
238. See Berger, supra note 156, at 264-65, 298. Berger explains schema as frames for
understanding experience: "We make sense out of new experiences by placing them into
categories and cognitive frames called schema or scripts that emerge from prior experience." Id.
at 264. On a larger level, schema provide a "cultural understanding that organizes knowledge of
events, people, objects, and their characteristic relationships in a single gestalt structure that is
experientially meaningful as a whole." Id. at 265 (internal quotations omitted). However, once a
knowledge structure involving schema exists, "judgments are more likely to be based on
assumptions derived from categories and schemas than on evidence of individual
characteristics" of a situation. Id at 298.
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However, in cases in which an appropriate stock story is not
available, or when cultural stock stories could work against the
drafter (in that they make the client's story appear implausible), the
drafter can still be aware of prevailing cultural stock stories and use
the techniques of narrative to avoid telling a tale making her right to
relief implausible.240
Further, even where some litigants complaining of discrimination
lack an existing appropriate stock story to utilize in pleadings, the
justice system over time can adapt, bringing new stories into the
canon of cultural stock stories; once a narrative becomes a part of a
culture, it is available for would-be storytellers to utilize, mining and
adapting the narrative for its applicability to the teller's own tale.241
Thus, to the extent plaintiffs continue drafting complaints that include
well-crafted factual narratives, and through the recursive process of
239. In the narrative transaction, often "plausibility is in the eye of the beholder." Kassem,
supra note 105, at 1447 (identifying studies showing that "whether one believes an invidious
discrimination narrative offered by a member of a particular group depends in significant part
on the personal background of the observer relative to that of the individual offering the
discrimination narrative"); see also Christine Metteer Lorillard, Stories That Make the Law Free:
Literature As A Bridge Between the Low and the Culture in Which It Must Exist, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REv. 251, 256 (2005) ("[Tlhe choice of which story to privilege is most often determined by
the story that comes closest to the experience of the listener."). To some extent, studies bear out
this theory: judges' backgrounds do correlate with case outcomes in some instances. E.g., Sue
Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129 (1993)
(finding "[t]he votes of women circuit court judges in employment discrimination and search
and seizure cases differ from those of their male counterparts"); Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision
Making of Clinton's Nontraditional judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 279 (1997) (studying
"decision making of President Clinton's nontraditional appointees to the federal district courts");
see also Kassem, supra note 105, at 1459 & n.66 (reviewing recent studies regarding how "race
and gender of individual judges impact judicial decision-making").
240. Sheppard, supra note 151, at 202-05 ("[W]hen a stock story that is not favorable to the
client is triggered by the facts of the case, and a suitable alternative stock story is not available, a
lawyer must tell a counterstory that presents the client's story from a different perspective. This
new perspective must be one that will not evoke the unfavorable embedded knowledge
structures triggered by the unfavorable stock story.").
241. Law and narrative has often been used as a way to bring outsider voices into the "fold"
of legal academia, promising that, once shared, outsider voices and stories can be better
understood by those who lack the lived experience reflected in the narratives. See, e.g., George A.
Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use of Narrative in Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 684
(1999) (exploring the importance of narrative "as a way to introduce a perspective that is not
represented in mainstream legal discourse").
Similarly, Sullivan has proposed using factual detail in discrimination complaints, "simply
pleading this social science [research demonstrating the pervasiveness of discrimination] as a
fact, thereby requiring the court to take that fact as true." Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1663. This
method also turns the notion of judicial experience and common sense on its head, by alleging
"pleading that the phenomenon of discrimination is more common than the courts might
otherwise believe." Id. at 1662. Along similar lines, Sherry suggests that one response to the
heightened pleading standard is to "attack its underlying factual assumptions" using empirical
work to study, among other things, the "meritoriousness of complaints that survive to the
motion-to-dismiss stage," the "costs of discovery generally or for particular cases." Sherry, supra
note 86, at 184.
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challenges through motions to dismiss and appeals, the common set of
stock stories available in our culture through which we understand
the world will expand, ultimately leading to better understanding of
which claims are plausible.242
Greater emphasis on narrative also helps resolve the problem of the
plausibility standard's ambiguity by providing judges with a practical
framework for assessing the plausibility of pleadings. By interpreting
the plausibility standard with reference to narrative, lower-court
judges can fill the gap between the Supreme Court's instructions in
Twombly and Iqbal and the difficult task of weighing a complaint's heft
to determine if it has passed the threshold from sheer possibility into
plausibility.
Indeed, at least one appellate court has explained that the
plausibility inquiry involves assessing pleadings for the strength of
the story they tell.243 The Seventh Circuit has interpreted the
plausibility inquiry as a charge to courts to evaluate pleadings based
on whether they contain "enough details about the subject-matter of
the case to present a story that holds together," by asking "could these
things have happened, not did they happen."244 This framework
obviously references narrative coherence-Is the story internally
consistent such that it "holds together"? Does it contain "enough
details" to be complete?-and narrative correspondence-Does the
story match the audience's social understanding of what could or
typically does happen?-and also provides a clear vocabulary and set
of referents for district court judges concerned with explaining their
reasoning to appellate courts. Judicial opinions on motions to
dismiss-which provide outcomes for the parties in a particular case,
guidelines for future litigants, and directions to other judges in the
form of precedent-will be strengthened by a greater focus on
narrative, because that focus eliminates some of the ambiguity of the
plausibility standard.245
242. Such an increased focus on narrative and the sharing of outside narratives could bring
into the mainstream of "judicial experience and common sense" some of the realities that,
according to critics of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, would be overlooked by the new
plausibility standard. See, e.g., Seiner, After Iqbal, supra note 73, at 196 (arguing that statistics
on employment discrimination demonstrate that it is "an everyday occurrence in our society,"
and thus "much more plausible on its face that employment discrimination has occurred than
that a high-level governmental conspiracy has been perpetrated or that a complex antitrust
violation has been carried out"); see also Kassem, supra note 105, at 1456-57 (finding that
"Muslim Americans say that discrimination and prejudice because of their Muslim identity is the
biggest problem they face in the United States" and that "surveys of the general American public
confirm that Muslim Americans are widely viewed with distrust and that anti-Muslim sentiment
has burgeoned in the United States post-9/11").
243. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).
244. Id.
245. A greater focus on narrative also resolves concerns about the legitimacy of the
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C. Narrative and Plausibility in Pleadings: Examples
Careful analysis of cases that have survived the motion to dismiss in
the post-Twombly and Iqbal world demonstrates that the use of
narrative techniques does indeed help litigants overcome the
plausibility standard. This section begins with a simple example of a
negligence plaintiff using increased narrative to create plausibility,
and then discusses four cases with more complex underlying facts and
governing law. Because the criticisms of plausibility standard focus in
particular on the effect that the standard can have on civil rights cases,
these examples use cases involving civil rights claims, broadly
construed. Two of the cases analyzed demonstrate pleadings that
successfully overcame the plausibility standard. The other two cases
show civil rights lawsuits that did not survive a motion to dismiss, and
demonstrate that litigants ignore narrative at their peril.
The civil rights cases below were selected based on the narrative
characteristics of the complaints themselves and on the analysis the
plausibility question received from appellate courts. These complaints
Supreme Court's action in making substantive changes to the Federal Rules outside the
rulemaking process. A greater focus on narrative does not resolve all concerns about judicial
activism, but it helps to mitigate those concerns. Although greater reliance on narrative cannot
excuse supplanting of the rulemaking process (as many critics allege the Supreme Court did),
understanding the Court's move to plausibility in Twombly and Iqbal as seeking more narrative
accounts of the facts making up a claim has normative appeal.
Proceeding from the principle that we should understand the Supreme Court to be working
within the bounds of its enumerated powers rather than outside it, we can link the new
appearance of the plausibility standard to the original Rule 8. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 951 (1983) ("When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the
Constitution has delegated to it."). Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 152 (1961). If we read the
Court's opinions in Twombly and Iqbal as asking for a renewed attention to narrative in
pleadings, then the Court is simply paraphrasing the requirement in Rule 8 that a plaintiff make
a "showing"-i.e., that he or she show, not tell, in the words of the writing-class axiom-that he
or she is "entitled to relief." Similarly, some of Spencer's advice is a variation on that familiar
phrase, "show, don't tell." Spencer, Restrictive Procedure, supra note 111, at 193 ("In the
discrimination context, a conclusory assertion might be that 'the defendant discriminates in
hiring decisions,' rather than, 'the defendant systematically rejects Hispanic applicants with
qualifications similar to those of non-Hispanic applicants that it hires.' The latter statement
reports facts; the former statement substitutes a legal characterization of those facts and
dispenses with factual reportage.").
Narrative also helps to deal with the criticism that plausibility will restrict access to justice.
Narrative is a morally neutral tool and its use can support meritorious and non-meritorious
claims. Brooks, supra note 215, at 416 ("[N]arrative is morally a chameleon that can be used to
support the worse as well as the better cause."). However, although narrative is ethically
neutral, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody a particular ethos: that of unrestrictive
pleading and increased access to justice. A greater focus on narrative would allow plaintiffs with
meritorious claims to demonstrate those merits at the pleading phase, satisfying the purposes
behind the Federal Rules. Although a move towards greater detail in pleading may seem at odds
with Rule 8's "short, plain statement" requirement and the simple format of the Federal Forms,
it is also true that the open spirit of the Rules favors more cases decided on their merits than on
procedural issues. A greater use of narrative, by increasing the number of "plausible" claims that
survive the motion to dismiss phase, would further the purposes of the Federal Rules.
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are not intended as models; the cases are used here merely as samples
that illustrate the potential for civil rights plaintiffs to use narrative in
stating claims that are plausible under the Twombly and Iqbal
standard.
1. A Short Story: Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc.
Because of its straightforward subject matter and relatively simple
facts, Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc.,246 a classic slip-and-fall case, is
highly illustrative of narrative's power to create plausibility. The
plaintiffs initial complaint was just a page long, containing only four
paragraphs of factual allegations.247 The plaintiff alleged that she was
"severely and permanently injured" and "suffered pain" after falling at
a Dollar General Store in Amherst County, Virginia.248 The other,
equally spare allegations included that the plaintiff "fell due to the
negligence of the Defendants [sic] agents and employees who
negligently failed to remove the liquid from the floor and had
negligently failed to place warning signs to alert and warn the Plaintiff
of the wet floor."249 The complaint, filed in state court in Virginia, was
removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.250
Not surprisingly, upon the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Western District of Virginia dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim under the "plausibility pleading" standard of the
Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal cases.251 The defendants argued
that the factual allegations in the complaint did not raise a plausible
inference that they were liable.252 The court found the plaintiff "failed
to allege any facts that show how the liquid came to be on the floor,
whether the Defendant knew or should have known of the presence of
the liquid, or how the Plaintiffs accident occurred."253 The failure to
include such factual allegations, required under Virginia law for a
246. Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *1 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 24, 2009).
247. Complaint at 1, Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447
(W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009).
248. Id
249. Id. Although the complaint in Branham was short, it compares neatly with the length
and level of detail contained in Form 11 of the Federal Forms, which by definition meets the
pleading standards in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; both contain fewer than five
paragraphs of factual allegations and are shorter than a page long. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.").
250. Id.
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negligence claim, was fatal to plaintiffs complaint.254 The court wrote
that without the missing factual allegations, the complaint was merely
"consistent with the possibility of the Defendant's liability," but did
not plausibly establish that the defendant was negligent."2s5 The court
gave the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.256
The amended complaint totaled three pages and fifteen paragraphs;
the real significance in the amendments, however, was not their
length, but rather the addition of significant narrativity.257 The
additions to the amended complaint in Branham demonstrate the use
of narrative to overcome plausibility. By comparing the initial
complaint with the amended complaint, readers can easily see how
detail and scene are being added to create plausibility.
First, the plaintiff added in specific factual detail; she alleged that
she had gone into the Dollar General Store "to shop for clothespins"
when an employee named "Jessica" told her "that she had to go to the
rear of the store and turn left at the last aisle to find the
clothespins."258 The plaintiff also included detail describing her path
through the store and her fall: "The Plaintiff went to the rear of the
store and turned left as instructed by 'Jessica.' .. . "Just as the Plaintiff
turned left she stepped on water that was on the floor and directly in
front of her."259 By including these details in her amended complaint,
the plaintiff developed a narrative that was more coherent (having
more of the expected parts of a story, with fewer "gaps" for the
audience to fill in with inference) and thus more plausible.
The amended complaint also made effective use of sequencing. In
writing the amended complaint, the plaintiff chose a non-linear
sequence; she did not describe the negligence as it occurred, but
rather as she discovered it. Plaintiff described her fall, then alleged
that she told Jessica about her fall:
11. The Plaintiff told "Jessica" that she had fallen on the water,
as she turned left at the last aisle at the back of the store.
12. As "Jessica" and the Plaintiff began walking back to the
front of the store "Jessica" took the Plaintiff several aisles to
254. Id. (noting that Virginia law requires a plaintiff to "establish that the defendant had
actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition on its premises and failed to remove it
within a reasonable time or to warn the plaintiff of its presence").
255. Id.
256. Id. at*3.
257. Amended Complaint, Branham v. DolgenCorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL
5211509 (W.D. Va. Sept 9, 2009).
258. Id. at *1. The Amended Complaint in Branham also included more characterization,
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the left where a sign indicating wet floor was lying flat on the
floor that sign was not visible to the Plaintiff when the plaintiff
had walked several aisles over to the rear of the store for
clothespins. There was no sign visible to Plaintiff to warn her
of the wet floor260
At the end of the amended complaint, the plaintiff made allegations
about how the hazard came to be in the store in the first place; she
described the hazardous condition as she encountered it and then
described how it had come to be, before her encounter (i.e., out of
chronological order).261 This adoption of an asynchronous sequence
emphasized the plaintiffs point of view and helped to create narrative
correspondence, demonstrating that it was indeed plausible that
plaintiff, a casual shopper, happened unaware upon a slippery floor in
a store where the sole warning sign was not in the path the store
employee told plaintiff to take. The details added in post-fall,
including the walk with Jessica through the store to find the "sign
indicating wet floor ... lying flat on the floor" also demonstrated that
defendant and its employees knew of the hazard.262
The defendant did not object to this amended complaint on
plausibility grounds.263 Thus, Branham's relatively straightforward
facts demonstrate how the addition of narrative techniques can help
overcome the plausibility standard.
2. Success Stories: Civil Rights Cases Displaying Effective Narrative
Techniques
Even in cases with more complex facts and standards, the
effectiveness of narrative is clear. The following cases are particularly
instructive because, in each case, a district court held that the
plausibility standard was not met, and the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to establish a
plausible claim. Reviewing the disparate ways the lower and appellate
courts applied the standard helps to demonstrate that plausibility
requires the application of narrative techniques.
a. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.
In Swanson v. Citibank, NA., Gloria Swanson and Charles Routen,




263. Subsequently, the Branham case underwent discovery and was later dismissed by
stipulation of the parties.
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after their home equity loan application was denied, alleging fraud
and discrimination in violation of several statutes, including the Fair
Housing Act (FHA).264 Swanson and Routen alleged that Citibank
discouraged them from applying for a home equity loan, and that
when they did apply for a loan, Citibank used an associated home
appraiser to give the home a low valuation that caused the loan to be
denied.265 Swanson and Routen claimed that all these actions were
taken on the basis of race.266
Swanson and Routen's complaint made effective use of sequencing.
Instead of starting with a chronological listing of events that occurred,
plaintiffs began with a summary of what the case was "about": in the
third paragraph of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the case
was not simply about the denial of their loan, but was also "about
Citibank's scheme of redlining in the African American community as
well as discrimination against Swanson and Routen due to their racial
ethnicity."267 The plaintiffs continued on to describe "redlining" and to
allege "Citibank's unethical practice of redlining in Plaintiffs' African
American community."268 The plaintiffs' use of a short summary at the
beginning of the complaint effectively focused the audience's
attention on the core factual allegations in the long (twenty-page)
amended complaint. Describing the practice of residential redlining
also created narrative correspondence by tying explicitly to the idea
of residential discrimination, which served as a "stock story" in the
case.
Following the summary of allegations about redlining, the plaintiffs
began their history of the events relevant to the complaint long before
Ms. Swanson ever entered Citibank. The plaintiffs described hearing
"an announcement" on the local news "that Citibank was releasing a
statement to the effect that it was going to make a concerted effort to
get more of the TARP money that it had accepted ... into the hands of
consumers in the form of equity loans, mortgages, credit cards and car
loans."269 Only after describing this announcement did the plaintiffs
put forth allegations about their application for an equity loan. This
was another effective instance of sequencing: Instead of starting with
the denial of their loan, plaintiffs laid out facts that established their
264. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010). For ease of discussion, this
article will only specifically discuss Swanson and Routen's FHA statutory claims.
265. Amended Complaint at 14-18, Swanson v. Citi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859-60 (N.D. Ill.
2009), rev'd in part sub nom. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09 C
2344).
266. Id.
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understanding that there might be more money available in loans to
homeowners. Such details contributed to the narrative's coherence,
making the story's elements more complete. The technique also
helped establish the plaintiffs' point of view as consumers who
believed the bank was eager to make loans.
The complaint also handled character development well, describing
the words and actions of two employees of Citibank with great
specificity. For instance, the plaintiffs described a branch manager
who "started her conversation with Swanson by literally telling
Swanson that while she ... was not trying to discourage Swanson
from making a loan application, Citibank's loan criteria was more
stringent" than those of another bank that had turned down a
previous application.270 Plaintiffs also described another bank
employee who made extensive small talk about race, creating an
atmosphere of defensiveness and heightened racial awareness that
added plausibility to the narrative that the bank employees were
making decisions based on race.271 Taken as a whole, the complaint
created a dramatic picture of the kind of interaction that took place
between the parties.
Upon a motion to dismiss, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed
Swanson and Routen's claims, under the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard, because it found that they had not alleged sufficient facts to
support an FHA claim.272
However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that it was error to
dismiss the FHA claim against Citibank because Swanson and Routen
had plausibly stated a claim for racial discrimination under the
FHA.273 According to the court, the complaint identified
the type of discrimination that she thinks occurred (racial), by
whom (Citibank, through Skertich, the manager, and the
outside appraisers it used), and when (in connection with her
effort in early 2009 to obtain a home-equity loan). This is all
that she needed to put in the complaint274
The Seventh Circuit mentioned the "other, largely extraneous facts"
that Swanson and Routen may have pled, such as "Citibank's
announced plan to use federal money to make more loans, its refusal
to follow through in her case, and Skertich's comment that he had a
270. Id. at 5-6.
271, Id.atlO.
272. Swanson v. Citi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859-60 (N.D. Ill. 2009), rev'd in part sub nom.
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010).
273. Swanson, 614 F.3d at 406-07.
274. Id. at 405.
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mixed-race family."275 The court concluded that Swanson had not
"pleaded herself out of court by mentioning these facts."276
From a narrative perspective, it is easy to see that those allegations
likely helped develop a narrative that struck its audience as plausible,
because the specific facts mentioned above established vivid
characters and a richly detailed account of the interactions between
Swanson and the Citibank employees; in short, those "largely
extraneous facts" made the story internally and externally consistent
and created narrative correspondence with the audience's
understanding of how the world works.
Indeed, in her opinion for the court, Judge Wood made reference to
the need for plaintiffs to put together a narrative: "As we understand
[Twombly and Iqbal], the Court is saying ... that the plaintiff must give
enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story
that holds together."277 Judge Wood further explained that the
plausibility inquiry requires the court to "ask itself could these things
have happened, not did they happen."278 As Judge Wood explained the
plausibility standard, the Supreme Court was explicitly asking for
narrative coherence-a story that holds together-and narrative
correspondence-could the story have happened, does this represent
an understanding about the way the world works. Significantly,
following the Swanson decision, at least one commentator noted that
the decision signaled a new era of storytelling in pleadings.279
b. Haley v. City of Boston
The complaint in Haley v. City of Boston also demonstrates the
power of narrative to establish plausibility. The plaintiff, James Haley,
had spent 34 years in prison for murder-of his sister-in-law's
boyfriend.280 Haley maintained his innocence throughout his
incarceration, and eventually obtained proof that exculpatory
evidence in the possession of the Boston Police Department had been
withheld.281 The withheld evidence included exculpatory interview
statements from the only witnesses who linked Haley to the crime
scene.282 Based on this evidence, Haley's conviction was vacated283 He
275. Id. at 405-06.
276. Id. at 406.
277. Id. at 404.
278. Id.
279. Miller, Double Play, supra note 82, at 36.
280. Complaint at 1, Haley v. City of Boston, 677 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D. Mass. 2009), amended in
part, C.A No. 09-10197-RGS, 2010 WL 3198900 (D. Mass. Aug. 12, 2010), affd in part rev'd in
part, 657 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (No. 09-10197-RGS).
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later sought damages against the City of Boston and two police
detectives under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the deprivation of due process.284
Haley's complaint effectively used a number of narrative techniques
to establish plausibility. For instance, the complaint used sequencing
artfully, beginning with a summary of significant details of the case in
order to grab the audience's attention. Instead of beginning with the
suppression of evidence or his conviction, Haley's complaint began
with the stark fact of the loss of so many years of his life, the most
profoundly important fact in the case: paragraph 1 of the complaint
reads, "Plaintiff James A. Haley spent 34 years in prison for a murder
he did not commit."285 The early focus supported the narrative's
coherence, by directing the reader to the intended interpretation of
the story.
The complaint then moved to Haley's discovery of exculpatory
evidence and his successful campaign to vacate his conviction, all
events that happened well after the withholding of evidence that
forms the legal basis for his due process claim.286 This narrative
sequence focused the audience on those details: Haley was wrongfully
convicted, he served many years in prison needlessly, and the State of
Massachusetts agreed that his conviction should be vacated. Through
this sequence, the complaint developed a structurally complete and
coherent narrative of an innocent man who has suffered needlessly.
In another place, Haley's complaint used a convergent narrative
structure, describing two different versions of Haley's actions on the
day of the murder. First, the complaint described the facts of the case
as the prosecution presented them: "According to the
Commonwealth's theory of the case,... Mr. Haley supposedly
struggled with and then killed [the victim]."287 The complaint then
shifted to Haley's own perspective, identifying that "[tihe alleged
actions described in the preceding paragraph did not occur," and
describing Haley's version of the events on the day of the murder,
when he attended a party and was at work.288 The convergent
narrative structure highlighted the vast difference between the
prosecution's version of the case and Haley's own version, plausibly
establishing the seriousness of the Commonwealth's misconduct and
the significance of Haley's deprivation. The structure also gave Haley's
story narrative coherence, in the sense that the story is complete; the
283. Id.
284, Id
285. Complaint, supra note 280, at 1.
286, Id.
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complaint offered an account of Haley's time that was missing from
the prosecution's rejected version of events.
Haley's complaint also used character development and point of
view to create a narrative that convincingly established his
entitlement to relief. The complaint established Haley's sympathetic
point of view by compressing the distance between narrator and
character, bringing the audience very close to Haley's own thoughts,
such as in this allegation: "Never losing faith that the truth would
prevail, Mr. Haley has continued to assert his innocence for more than
three decades."289 The complaint used Haley's voice, to very
persuasive effect. Under the heading "Plaintiffs Injuries," the
complaint listed a number of "basic human experience[s]" of which
Haley was "wrongfully deprived"290:
He missed out on the ability to share holidays, births, funerals
and other life events with loved ones, the opportunity to fall in
love and marry and to pursue a career, and the fundamental
freedom to live one's life as an autonomous human being.291
This simple language and list of details sounds much more like a
man's real regret and more credibly established the impact of the
alleged deprivation, than would a bare legal conclusion that Haley
"suffered damage."
Through this use of narrative technique, Haley's complaint
confronted the reader (and the court) with a stock script-that of the
person who is wrongly accused and loses years of his life. The
wrongly convicted or wrongly accused defendant is an archetypal
story in our culture,292 and tying into it enhanced the plausibility of
Haley's story by giving it narrative correspondence.
The district court dismissed Haley's complaint on qualified
immunity grounds, noting that there were "no supporting facts to
satisfy the enhanced pleading standard set out in Twombly and
Iqbal."293
The First Circuit took a more favorable view of the facts, reversing
289. Id. at 1.
290. Id at 8.
291. Id. at 8-9.
292. See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE CONFESSION (2010); HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD
(1960); Steve Barnes, Rogue Narcotics Agent in Texas is Found Guilty in Perjury Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2005, at A12 (describing mass wrongful arrests in Tulia, Texas); Susan Saulny,
Convictions and Charges Voided in '89 Central ParkJogger Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al
(reporting on five men freed thirteen years after wrongful rape convictions); CONVICTION (Fox
Searchlight Pictures 2010).
293. Haley v. City of Boston, 677 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (D. Mass. 2009), amended in part, C.A.
No. 09-10197-RGS, 2010 WL 3198900 (D. Mass. Aug. 12, 2010), affd in part rev'd in part, 657
F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011).
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the district court's dismissal.294 The First Circuit called the police
behavior "parlous" and wrote that "Haley's complaint sketches an
unattractive tableau of the detectives' conduct."295 The court read
Haley's complaint as telling the plausible story of a man who
"seasonably requested production of all exculpatory and
impeachment evidence" and of detectives who "purposely failed to tell
either the prosecutor or defense counsel about" exculpatory and
impeachment evidence.296 The narrative techniques described above
helped Haley meet the plausibility standard.
3. Unlikely Stories: Civil Rights Cases Failing to Use Effective Narrative
Techniques
In addition to reviewing cases in which pleaders met the plausibility
standard, it is also instructive to look at cases in which trial and
appellate courts agreed that pleaders failed to meet the plausibility
standard. Such cases show real ways failing to adopt narrative
techniques may make a difference to clients.
a. HDC, LLC v. City ofAnn Arbor
HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor demonstrates that mere inclusion of
voluminous factual detail, to the exclusion of other narrative
techniques, will not satisfy the plausibility standard. There, a group of
developers entered into an option agreement with the City of Ann
Arbor to develop city-owned land.297 The developers' goal was to
create housing for individuals suffering from mental and physical
challenges or recovering from substance abuse.298 The city terminated
the agreement after the developers failed to meet certain permit
conditions.299
In a complaint spanning 26 pages and 132 paragraphs, the plaintiffs
alleged that the permit conditions were impossible to meet, and that
Ann Arbor had used the failure to meet the conditions as a pretense
for terminating the agreement; the alleged underlying reason for the
termination was that the developer was planning to build housing for
individuals with disabilities, and the city had engaged in
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.300 As written, the
294. Haley, 657 F.3d at 44.
295. Id. at 46, 50.
296. Id.atso.
297. Complaint and Jury Demand, HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, No. 09-14027, 2010 WL
2232220 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2010), affd, 675 F.3d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2012).
298. 675 F.3d at 610.
299. Id.
300. Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 297, Although the developers alleged
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complaint began prior to year 2000 and detailed extensively the back
and forth between the city and developers.301
The complaint did not, however, mention that the plaintiffs were
developing supportive housing or mention the potential residents'
physical and mental challenges until its third page302 Not until the
very end of the general factual allegations did the complaint mention
the plaintiffs' belief the city had a desire to prevent individuals with
disabilities from living at the chosen site.303 The first time
discriminatory intent was even mentioned was on page 15; even then,
the complaint used conclusory allegations in the place of details.3o4
For instance, the complaint alleged that "[t]he City arbitrarily and
unlawfully thwarted Plaintiffs' efforts to develop the Property" and
that "[t]he actions of the City were taken with a discriminatory intent,
purpose and motivation."305
The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and applying the
plausibility standard, the Eastern District of Michigan granted the
motion.306 The court found the complaint contained only conclusory
allegations of discrimination, such as alleging "discriminatory intent"
without further elaboration.o7 The district court also found an
"obvious alternative explanation" for claimed discriminatory
behavior: legitimate business reasons regarding delay on permit
conditions.o8 Thus, plaintiffs' conclusory allegation of discrimination
could not overcome the plausibility standard.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, explaining that the claims of disparate
treatment were implausible because plaintiffs were a sophisticated
land development firm; they agreed to the demolition permit
condition during the negotiation of agreement; and Ann Arbor
voluntarily engaged in the development for two years, aware of the
developers' proposed project and who would be housed in it.309 The
court found it important that the complaint provided no facts
supporting the inference that Ann Arbor sought to derail the project
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation claims, in addition to
state contract claims, this discussion focuses on the federal fair housing claims, specifically the
disparate treatment claims.
301. Id.at 2-13.
302. Id at 3.
303. Id at 14.
304. Id. at 15-16.
305. Id. at 16.
306. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 09-14027, 2010 WL 2232220 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2010)
affd, 675 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2012).
307. Id.at*3-5.
308. Id. at *5.
309. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2012).
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because it would house individuals with disabilities.31o
A review of the complaint in HDC demonstrates that narrative
techniques could have improved the complaint and demonstrated the
claim was plausible. First, although the complaint is lengthy and
includes some detail about the negotiations between the city and the
developers, the detail was not meaningful. The plaintiffs could have
enhanced the narrative's coherence and made better use of less space
by focusing on details central to their claim; excessive details about
the business deal between plaintiffs and the city was, at best,
distracting to the audience.
The complaint also could have made better use of sequencing.
Beginning, as plaintiffs did, with a long history of the interactions
between the parties, may have only supported the courts' notions that
it was more plausible the City engaged in good faith in negotiations
with plaintiffs. The plaintiffs might have been more successful if they
had begun by drawing their audience's attention to the ultimate
termination of the contract-along with any non-conclusory factual
details.
Finally, the plaintiffs in HDC could have utilized narrative
correspondence, the match-up between the content of a particular
story and the stock stories of a larger culture, to strengthen their
complaint's plausibility. Had the complaint tapped into a "stock story"
about NIMBY-ism among communities like Ann Arbor, the plaintiffs
might have had more success in demonstrating the plausibility of
their allegations that they were victims of intentional discrimination
or suffered an improper disparate impact.
b. Uppal v. Hospital Corp. ofAmerica
The fate of the complaint in Uppal v. Hospital Corp. of America 3"
similarly demonstrates that failing to use narrative techniques can
strip a complaint of plausibility. There, a medical doctor sued four
hospitals and the parent company of three of those hospitals for race
and gender discrimination.312 Uppal alleged that she was the victim of
discrimination and was subjected to a hostile work environment on
the basis of her gender, race and national origin.313 She also alleged
that she was retaliated against for complaining to her employer
regarding the unlawful discrimination and harassment.314
310. Id.at612-14.
311. Third Amended Complaint, Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., No. 8:09-cv-634-T-33TBM,
2011 WL 2631869 (M.D. Fla. July 5, 2011), affd, 482 F. App'x 394 (11th Cir. 2012).
312. Id.at2-3.
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Uppal's complaint detailed problems at work, including being
suspended, losing patient referrals, having negative letters written
about her to other hospitals, and losing privileges at various hospitals
due to her lack of board re-certification.31s However, the complaint
did not give any details illustrating how she was being treated
differently than others similarly situated; instead, the complaint
stated (in conclusory fashion) allegations such as the following:
"Other similarly situated employees outside Plaintiffs protected
classes who had disciplinary issues at other hospitals were not denied
privileges" at one of the defendant hospitals.316 Uppal's complaint, on
the whole, suggests that she was aware of more specific factual
information but failed to provide it in a narrative form.
The district court held that Dr. Uppal's complaint failed to allege
with the plausibility required by Twombly and Iqbal that the hospitals
treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected classes
more favorably.317 According to the court, her discrimination counts
stated in a conclusory fashion that other similarly situated employees
not of Uppal's gender, race and/or national origin were not treated in
the same way as Uppal, but did not support these claims with any
factual allegations.318 The court found it was not plausible that gender,
race and/or national origin played any role whatsoever in Defendant's
actions.319 Instead, "the generic factual allegations showed workplace
difficulties entirely consistent with non-gender, non-national origin
and non-racebased personality disputes."320
The Eleventh Circuit agreed, noting that Dr. Uppal's repeated
allegations that "[o]ther similarly situated employees outside
Plaintiffs protected classes" engaged in similar misconduct, but were
not disciplined, was not factual, but rather only recited in a conclusory
fashion an element of a prima fade Title VII case.321 Because she
"never once supplemented these allegations of disparate treatment
with any factual detail, such as even a brief description of how the
alleged comparator employees were outside of her protected class,"
Dr. Uppal failed to meet the plausibility standard.322
Dr. Uppal's complaint could have been improved by the application
of narrative techniques, in particular, detail. Had Dr. Uppal's
315. Id. at5-8.
316. Id.at7.
317. Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 8:09-CV-634-T-33TBM, 2011 WL 2631869, at *3-*4 (M.D.
Fla. July 5,2011) affd, 482 F. App'x 394 (11th Cir. 2012).
318. Id at *4.
319. Id
320. Id
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complaint identified with detail any individuals who were treated
differently than she was, that would have made her story more
plausible. More information would have given her complaint narrative
coherence, because it would have contained the expected parts of the
story. Absent such detail, the problem with Dr. Uppal's complaint is
that it does match up to a stock story with which many lawyers,
judges, and law clerks are no doubt familiar-the story of someone
who has problems at work. Without more detail regarding the
treatment she encountered or "how the alleged comparator
employees were outside of her protected class," Dr. Uppal's narrative
did not correspond to a story about discrimination.
Developing character or point of view could also have enhanced
that stock story. Compared to Haley's complaint, Dr. Uppal's
complaint is lacking in the detail, character development, and artfully-
rendered point of view that made his claim appear more plausible.
Here, more personal details would have enabled Dr. Uppal to depart
from the stock story about a woman plagued with personal troubles at
work and would have given the audience a plausible discrimination
story.
As both Uppal and HDC show, legal writers who ignore narrative
theory and narrative techniques do so at their peril; the application of
narrative to complaints in this world of plausibility pleading gives
litigants a powerful tool.
D. Resolving Possible Problems with an Increased Emphasis on
Narrative
While an increased reliance on narrative shows great promise for
understanding and overcoming the plausibility standard, there are
several challenges that this increased reliance might pose. An
increased reliance on narrative may raise several key concerns,
including: (a) "pleading one's self out of court"; (b) negative
implications for later discovery; and (c) unethical behavior. However,
such concerns should not be an impediment to the use of narrative.
Given the definition of the plausibility inquiry, and the way lower
courts have applied it, "pleading one's self out of court"323-in other
words, including additional facts so that that another interpretation of
the facts, other than plaintiffs claim, appears equally or more
plausible-is not likely to be a problem. Even in Twombly, the Court
found the existence of an obvious alternative explanation mattered
323. See, e.g., Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that, while a
plaintiff may fail to plead sufficient facts to meet a pleading standard, a "complaint can also
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only insofar as it rendered the plaintiffs claim less than plausible.324
Thus, as long as the plaintiffs claim is plausible, the existence of other
alternative explanations should not matter until the plaintiff is
required to prove his or her claim. The only time to be concerned with
over-pleading is when the extensive facts, as pleaded, demonstrate
that plaintiff cannot as a matter of law recover on his claim.325
For example, in a recent Seventh Circuit case, a lower court
concluded that a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination had "pleaded
herself out of court" by including in her complaint facts that might
have supported a theory of politically-based animus.326 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, on the ground that, even if the plaintiffs complaint
made other theories of recovery plausible as well, that did not detract
from the plausibility of the plaintiffs claim.327 The court reiterated the
familiar maxim that legal inconsistency in a complaint-that is, facts
consistent with other claims in addition to the claim being asserted-
could be tolerated, as long as the facts pleaded in the complaint made
the plaintiffs claim plausible.328
Increased reliance on narrative in complaints, including specific
factual allegations in the complaint, also should not raise concerns
about whether pleaders will encounter discovery problems down the
road, in those cases when a pleader hopes to develop further factual
knowledge through broad discovery.329 First, Rule 26 permits a broad
scope of discovery, including "any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense."33o Concerned litigants can
also tailor the degree to which their allegations will foreclose later
discovery. As well, pleading with greater focus on narrative, including
specific facts and details, may remind parties of the proper focus for
discovery. To the extent more narrative in pleading narrows issues for
discovery, the practice will have the salutary effect of decreasing
litigation costs for both sides and effectuating one of the Court's goals
for the plausibility pleading standard.331
324. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567-68.
325. See, e.g., Edwards, 478 F.3d at 830.
326. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The district court
concluded that Ms. Tamayo pleaded herself out of court by filling twenty-two pages of her
complaint with facts showing the political motivations behind her low pay and constructive
discharge.") (citing Tamayo v. Hamer, 06 C 3151, 2007 WL 1576528 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2007) affd




329. See, e.g., Fajans & Falk, supra note 200, at 15.
330. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
331. See, e.g., Rebecca Love Kourlis et. al., Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245,
247 (2010) ("Discovery would still be available to flesh out evidence on disputed issues, albeit in
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Another potential objection to increased use of narrative in
complaints is that reliance on narrative may give rise to greater
temptation for litigants to engage in unethical behavior, including
making false statements in complaints.332 The fear of sanctions could
be one reason that litigants have not already seized on the narrative
tools this article proposes.333 However, Rule 11 sanctions have
applied since long before the advent of the plausibility standard, and
lawyers are familiar with the rule's requirements.334
Greater reliance on narrative may also raise the question whether it
is ethical to exploit one's knowledge of narrative persuasion to gain an
advantage in litigation.335 Such a criticism-that the use of narrative
could be "exploitative"-would reflect another of the law's attempts
to keep its "narrativity" out of sight by defining itself as objective and
rational.336 However, there is sufficient recognition that "story is ... an
important element in law"337 to rebut any argument that use of
narrative to persuade is in and of itself exploitative. Moreover, the risk
of indeterminacy in every story-that is, the chance that an audience,
including a judge, may discern a different story than the one the
teller/advocate intends-should guard against the risk of exploitation
through use of narrative.338
Finally, it should be noted that, even though increased focus on
narrative has great promise for litigants and courts in resolving the
plausibility standard, narrative may not receive explicit acceptance in
the terms this article proposes. Law has long denied its interaction
with narrative, or tried to regulate the kinds of stories that can be
a more focused manner. The pleading of material facts... would not be designed to restrict
access to the courts; to the contrary, it would increase access by making participation in civil
litigation economically more feasible.").
332. See, e.g., Fajans & Falk, supra note 200, at 41 ("Facts that have the ring of truth but
which cannot be verified, or even investigated, should likewise be omitted, for fear of invoking
Rule 11 or its state analogues.").
333. Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1675 (noting that although a highly-detailed approach might
allow a plaintiff to claim any fact to avoid dismissal, such allegations would be constrained by
Rule 11's limitations on the factual investigation necessary); Yin, supra note 86, at 212 (noting
that "sanctions could be a reason" why litigants do not craft more elaborate factual allegations).
334. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. ("By presenting to the court a pleading... an attorney...
certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge... the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or... will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation....").
335. See, e.g., Brian Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 17, 47 (2008) (noting the possibility that stories tend "to facilitate
abuse by advocates because of stories' possible appeal to emotion over intellect").
336. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 215, at415.
337. Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 740 (1997); see also infra
notes 215-25.
338. See Foley, supra note 335, at 47 (arguing that, in order to let "the audience construct
and experience the meaning of the story for itself... the storyteller must give up some control
over that meaning-making, lest the storyteller turn the story into a mere rhetorical argument").
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told, in order to maintain its objectivity and disciplinarity.339 However,
even without explicit recognition in a court opinion, litigants can be
aware of the possibilities of narrative to establish plausibility and
judges can look for narrative in complaints.
CONCLUSION
The "plausibility" standard set out in Twombly and Iqbal has been
criticized for its departure from the spirit of the Federal Rules, its
arbitrariness, and its deleterious effects on the administration of
justice. Nonetheless, it is the law of the land, and lower court judges
and litigants must learn to adapt to its requirements. Narrative theory
can help both judges and litigants adjust to the plausibility standard.
Indeed, a review of court opinions reveals that lower courts are taking
the Supreme Court's plausibility standard seriously and are evaluating
pleadings based, in large part, on the strength of the stories those
pleadings tell.
Litigants can help move their claims across the line of plausibility by
making better use of narrative techniques. Narrative techniques may
be especially useful to a plaintiff who asserts a claim of illegal
discrimination or another civil rights violation, as it is in these
contexts that a judge's "judicial experience and common sense" may
diverge most significantly from the litigant's allegations. In such
instances, a litigant should consider the ways audience members
(who may or may not share the same cultural background and stock
stories) will "read" her allegations and should consider utilizing
additional narrative techniques to demonstrate a claim's plausibility.
Similarly, judges should pay attention to narrative theory and open
themselves to a consciousness of the ways a narrative works upon a
reader. When employing "judicial experience and common sense," a
judge must also be aware of the possibility of other stories that could
be told besides the stock stories most familiar to the judge, and be
careful to neutrally assess the plausibility of a plaintiff's claim.
Through greater awareness of narrative theory and greater use of
narrative techniques, the story of plausibility pleading-which is still
being told-may yet have a happy ending.
339. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions-Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that one can "search in vain for any explicit recognition by
legal decision-makers that how a story is told can make a difference in legal outcomes"). See also
id at 9 ("While justices can be sensitive readers of narrative accounts, there is virtually no
recognition in Court opinions that there may be a general problem of narrative, that is, with the
forms of telling in which issues are presented.").
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